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trade sanctions and human rights –
past, present, and future
Carlos Manuel Va´zquez*
abstract
The relationship between the international law of trade and the international
law of human rights has commanded an increasing amount of scholarly
attention in the past few years, perhaps spurred by the well-known events at
Seattle in 1999. This article offers some reflections on this relationship,
focusing on the permissibility under international law of imposing trade
sanctions against nations that commit violations of international human
rights. Part I begins with some reflections on the historical relationship
between these two bodies of law. Part I also considers why the human rights
community appears to feel threatened by the international trade system, and
not the other way around. Part II considers whether, under current trade
norms, trade concessions may be suspended in response to human rights
violations. Part III turns to the normative question: how should the WTO
address human rights?
i. past
The nature and extent of the linkage between the international law of human
rights and the international law of trade has been the subject of extensive
commentary in recent years. To evaluate the arguments and proposals that
have been made in this field, it is useful to begin by considering the historical
relation between these two bodies of law, beginning with the era before there
was any such thing as an international law of human rights or a multilateral
international law of trade.
In the nineteenth century, the so-called classical period of international law,
the obligations imposed on states by international law could be ‘enforced’ in a
number of ways. Tribunals with a general compulsory jurisdiction over states
were non-existent, although states often formed ad hoc tribunals to resolve
particular disputes. In the absence of an agreement to submit a dispute to
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such a tribunal, states enforced their rights under international law through
diplomatic intervention, countermeasures, and ultimately the use of military
force. War was not illegal under international law, and the use of force –
subject to principles of necessity and proportionality – was among the
mechanisms recognized by international law for enforcing the norms of
international law. Measures short of war that served this purpose included the
suspension of trade benefits – what we would today regard as trade sanctions.
During this period, there was no such thing as an international law of
human rights. This is not to say that international law did not impose
obligations on states with respect to the treatment of individuals, but it only
addressed their obligations with respect to the nationals of another state. A
state’s treatment of its own nationals was not regarded as a concern of other
states or of the international community. Indeed, one of the principal
functions of international law during this period was to insulate a state from
international criticism for how it treated its own nationals.
This aspect of international law changed fundamentally in the twentieth
century. The atrocities of the Second World War convinced the world that a
state’s treatment of its own nationals was indeed a proper concern of the
international community. An international bill of rights was adopted,
consisting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Interna-
tional Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic and Social
Rights.1 These have been supplemented by numerous other human rights
conventions and treaties.2 Although not all such conventions have been
ratified by all countries, many have been ratified by most countries.
Additionally, a customary international law of human rights has evolved
binding states that are not parties to these conventions. And some
fundamental human rights norms have attained the status of jus cogens,
meaning that states may not contract out of them by treaty.3
At roughly the same time that the international law of human rights
emerged, the UN Charter came into force and established that international
law prohibited the use of force by one or a group of nations against the
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1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 Dec. 1948, G.A. RES. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
pt. 1, at 71 [hereinafter Univ. Dec. Hum. Rts.], U.N. Doc. A/180; International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 16 Dec. 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 Dec. 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
2 See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide
Convention), 9 Dec. 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; International Convention on Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, 21 Dec. 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 ,5. I.L.M. 352 (1966); Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 18 Dec. 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 19
I.L.M. 33 (1980); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, 10 Dec. 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified, 24 I.L.M.
535 (1985); Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 Nov. 1989 [hereinafter Conv. on Rts. of the
Child], 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989).
3 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969 [hereinafter Vienna Convention], U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, art. 53.
territorial integrity of another state except in self-defense.4 This meant that
the use of military force was no longer among the mechanisms to which states
could generally resort to enforce their rights under international law. The UN
Charter might thus be understood to have created a hierarchy among the
norms of international law, establishing peace and the territorial integrity of
states as the paramount norms of the international legal system, to which the
other norms were subordinated, including the newly recognized norms of
human rights.5 States were permitted to use force only in response to armed
attacks against their territorial integrity, and the Security Council was
empowered to authorize the use of force only in response to a ‘threat to the
peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression’.6
The elimination of military force from the arsenal of mechanisms available
to enforce the norms of international law (other than those relating to peace
and territorial integrity) left states with the ability to employ countermeasures
not involving the use of force for this purpose. Prominent among such
countermeasures was the suspension of any trade concessions previously
granted by the injured state to the offending state. To the extent such
concessions were conferred ex gratia, they could be unilaterally withdrawn
even in the absence of a violation of international law. If conferred by treaty,
however, such concessions could be withdrawn, consistently with interna-
tional law, only in response to a violation of that treaty or another norm of
international law by the beneficiary of the concession.7 (The suspension by a
state of an international obligation owed to another state in response to the
latter state’s violation of an international obligation owed to it is known as a
countermeasure.8) In short, the prohibition of the use of force left trade
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4 UN Charter, art. 2, para 4 (establishing norm against the use of force); UN Charter, art. 51
(providing exception to norm against use of force in case of self-defense). The UN Charter
prohibition on the use of force had been preceded by a similar prohibition in the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
See General Treaty for the Renunciation of War (Kellogg-Briand Pact), 27 Aug, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343,
94 L.N.T.S. 57 (arts. I and II condemning recourse to war and prohibiting resolution of disputes
except by peaceful means).
5 See Anthony Clark Arend and Robert J. Beck, International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN
Charter Paradigm (London; New York: Routledge, 1993) 34, 40–45 (discussing the primacy of peace
over justice in the UN Charter).
6 UN Charter, art. 39. See also UN Charter, art. 42 (empowering the Security Council to ‘take such
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security’); UN Charter, art. 2, para 4 (prohibiting nations from ‘the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state . . . ’).
7 Marian Nash, ‘Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law’, 92 Am. J.
Int’l L. 251, 252 (1998) (section I of article discussing countermeasures under international law).
8 See Draft Articles on the Responsibilities of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Adopted by the
International Law Commission at Its 53rd Session (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles on State
Responsibility], art. 49(2). The term ‘countermeasure’ is sometimes used to refer not only to reprisals
(the non-performance by a state of an obligation owed to another state in response to the other state’s
violation of an international obligation owed to it) but also retorsion (an unfriendly act not amounting to
a breach of an international obligation taken in response to another state’s violation of an international
obligation). See Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and in Practice (Kluwer, 1991) 185. I shall
use the term here, as it is used in the Draft Articles, to refer only to reprisals.
sanctions as among the most coercive of the available mechanisms for
enforcing the norms of international law, including international human
rights norms.9
However, another contemporaneous development potentially restricted the
use of this mechanism as well. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(hereinafter the GATT),10 a treaty concluded by many, though not all, of the
Members of the United Nations, barred quantitative restrictions in imports
and exports11 and entitled all parties to Most Favored Nation treatment by
other parties,12 as well as to national treatment of their imported goods.13
These provisions were subsequently incorporated into the WTO agreements
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9 The extent to which State A is permitted under general international law to take countermeasures in
response to State B’s violation of the human rights of its own citizens is a matter of some debate. The
International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility would permit only the ‘injured
state’ to take countermeasures, and they define ‘injured state’ to include, in the case of obligations
owed to the international community as a whole, only states ‘specially affected’ by the violation. See
Draft Articles on the Responsibilities of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Adopted by the International
Law Commission at Its 53rd Session (2001), art. 42 (defining ‘injured state’), art. 49 (entitling only an
‘injured state’ to take countermeasures). However, the Draft Articles may in this respect be more an
attempt at the progressive development of international law than a codification of established law. Cf.
David Bederman, ‘Counterintuiting Countermeasures’, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 817 (2001) (considering
other respects in which the Draft Articles’ provisions on countermeasures amount to progressive
development). An earlier version of the Draft Articles would have defined an ‘injured state’ to include
all states in cases where ‘the right [that was violated] has been created or is established for the
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms’. Art. 40, International Law Commission,
Draft Articles on States Responsibility Adopted on First Reading, Report of the International Law Commission
on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc A/51/10 (1996), available at www.un.org/law/ilc/
archives/statfra.htmThe ILC’s earlier position seems more consistent with the status of fundamental
human rights norms as obligations erga omnes. Because such obligations are owed to the international
community as a whole, one would think that all states would have standing to take the measures
available under international law to respond to violations. That appears to be the position of the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, which states in comment (a)
to section 905 that ‘[t]he principles governing unilateral countermeasures apply as well when a state
responds to a violation of an obligation to all states (erga omnes)’. That all states may take
countermeasures in response to violations of human rights by other states – at least the most serious
violations – appears to be the prevailing view among scholars as well. See Lorand Bartels, ‘Article XX
of GATT and the Problem of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’, 36 J. World Tr. 353, 362–63 and n 48
(2002); Jonathan I. Charney, ‘NATO’s Kosovo Intervention: Anticipatory Humanitarian Interven-
tion in Kosovo’, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 834, 835 (1999);YoramDinstein, ‘The erga omnes Applicability of
Human Rights’, 30 Archiv desVo¨lkerrechts 16, 17–18 (1992); Karin Oellers-Frahm, ‘Comment:The
erga omnes Applicability of Human Rights’, 30 Archiv des Vo¨lkerrechts 28, 31 (1992); Pieter Jan
Kuyper, ‘International Legal Aspects of Economic Sanctions’, in Petar Sarcevic and Hans van Houtte
(eds), Legal Issues in International Trade (London; Boston: Graham & Trotman, 1990) 152; Bruno
Simma, ‘Self-Contained Regimes’, 16 Netherlands Y.B. Int’l L. 111, 133 (1985). But see Prosper
Weil, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?’, 77 Am J. Int’l L. 413, 432–33 (1983).
The remainder of this article assumes that all states would be entitled to take countermeasures in
response to serious violations of fundamental human rights by other states, in the absence of any
specific limitation of this power in the GATT or other treaties.
10 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 Oct. 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, T.I.A.S. No. 1700
[hereinafter GATT 1947].
11 GATT 1947, art. XI.
12 GATT 1947, art. I.
13 GATT 1947, art. III.
of 199414 and are central to the WTO regime of international trade
regulation. These provisions appear on their face to prohibit the imposition
of trade sanctions on Member States. It is these provisions that have given rise
to concern among international human rights advocates.
One might well ask why it is the advocates of international human rights
who fear a potential conflict with international trade norms and not
international trade advocates who fear a conflict with international human
rights norms. As noted above, even before there was a GATT, states had
concluded numerous bilateral agreements with each other – known as
Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (hereinafter FCN
treaties) – in which they agreed to afford other states rights much like those
in the multilateral GATT, such as MFN status and national treatment. Under
general international law, a violation by one state of one of its obligations
under international law would entitle another state to take action – subject to
rules about proportionality – that it would otherwise be precluded from taking
under international law. Thus, if State A breached a non-trade-related treaty
obligation towards State B, State B would be justified in withholding an
obligation to State A under an FCN treaty.15 If so, then would we not reach
the same conclusion under the GATT/WTO? In other words, even if the
GATT requires parties to afford MFN status to other parties, don’t general
rules of customary international law entitle parties to withhold such a benefit
in response to violation of other international law norms by other parties? If
so, then perhaps it is international trade advocates who should be worried, as
the benefits of agreements such as the GATT could well be lost in the event of
human rights violations.
There appear to be two reasons why the concern is largely on the side of the
human rights community. First, the concern is not just that the GATT/WTO
requires that parties be granted MFN status, but more specifically that it
forbids trade sanctions even in response to violations of human rights or other
norms of international law, in much the same way that the UN Charter forbids
the use of force even in response to a violation of international law by other
states (except in limited circumstances). In other words, the claim that
concerns human rights activists is that the WTO purports to deny the human
rights regime the ability to employ trade sanctions as countermeasures. I
consider below whether the GATT does in fact restrict the availability of trade
sanctions in response to human rights violations, but let us assume for present
purposes that it does. If that is the content of the trade rule, then it purports to
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14 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Annex 1A, 15 Apr. 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125,
1154 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
15 See generally Schachter, above n 8, 190–91 (1991) (addressing the relationship between the Vienna
Convention and the traditional international law of countermeasures). See also Peter Malanczuk,
Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th edn, London; New York: Routledge, 1997)
271–72.
eliminate the possibility of using trade sanctions to enforce human rights
norms. If the human rights norm is one that does not have the status of jus
cogens, then the subsequent conclusion of a treaty in which the parties agree
not to impose trade sanctions for the violation of the norm prevails under
well-established principles of international law (lex posterior).16
Even if the relevant human rights norm is one that has attained the status of
jus cogens, a subsequent treaty agreeing not to employ trade sanctions to
enforce the norm would appear to be valid under general international law.
Presumably, the norm having jus cogens status is the substantive norm
prohibiting the behavior that directly infringes the relevant human right. The
rule that allows other states to impose trade sanctions in response to a
violation of jus cogens does not itself have jus cogens status. Indeed, it is difficult
to see how a permissive rule could ever have the status of jus cogens. If
international law merely permits states to impose trade sanctions in response
to a violation of a jus cogens norm by another state, then an agreement among
a subset of states not to exercise this power would appear to be
unproblematic. The later norm would be valid under international law
because it does not conflict with the jus cogens norm.17
For the same reason, the trade rule would be valid even if the relevant rule
of international law entered into force after the trade rule. A later-in-time rule
of human rights law – that is, a rule imposing certain obligations on states with
respect to their own nationals – would not conflict with an agreement among
the same states not to use trade sanctions in response to a violation of the rule
by other states.
For this reason, the important issue for international lawyers is what the
trade norm purports to require. If the trade rule prohibits the use of trade
sanctions even in response to a violation of human rights law by another state,
then there would appear to be nothing in general international law that would
call the validity of such a rule into doubt. If the trade norm is in fact of that
nature, then it might plausibly be claimed that the trade regime purports to set
up a hierarchy of norms in much the same fashion as do the norms regarding
the use of force. Just as the norms regarding the use of force might be said to
elevate peace and territorial integrity as the paramount norms of the
international system, so might the trade regime be said to elevate trade
norms over the remaining norms of the international legal system. Under the
UN Charter, force may be used by states in response to a violation of the
prohibition of the use of force (i.e., in self-defense). If the WTO agreements
prohibit the use of economic sanctions to respond to violations of
international law other than those in the trade agreements themselves, then
802 Journal of International Economic Law (JIEL) 6(4)
16 Vienna Convention, art. 30.
17 For more on whether international law includes a norm requiring states to ban the importation of
products made in a manner that violates jus cogens norms, see below text accompanying nn 92–98.
the non-trade-related norms of international law are not even potentially
backed by either of the two most coercive sanctions in the international legal
system.
Hence the concern of human rights advocates: With the prohibition of the
use of force, only countermeasures not involving force remained available to
enforce human rights norms. Trade sanctions are perhaps the most coercive
of such measures, and they have been among the most widely used. Trade
sanctions against South Africa are widely credited with having hastened the
fall of the apartheid regime in that country.18 Trade sanctions have long been
threatened by the United States against China for its human rights violations.
Human rights advocates have expressed concern that China’s admission to
the WTO would insulate it from such sanctions.19 More generally, human
rights advocates fear that the elimination of trade sanctions as a mechanism
for enforcing human rights norms would render international human rights
norms relatively toothless.20
But the fact that trade law purports to restrict the ability of states to employ
trade sanctions in response to human rights violations does not fully explain
why human rights activists are so concerned. All rules of international law can
be broken (as a factual matter, although of course not as a legal matter). If
State A violates a rule of international human rights law, then what is to
prevent State B from responding to it by violating its obligation under the
GATT not to impose trade sanctions in response to the violation? At this
point, the human rights activist points to the relative efficacy of the WTO’s
mechanisms for enforcing trade law. When the WTO was created in 1994, a
complex dispute settlement system was added to the GATT, empowering
parties injured by a violation of the WTO agreements to initiate proceedings
against the violator.21 Although the system is still fairly new, it is already
widely regarded as perhaps the most effective dispute settlement system in
international law.22 The enforcement scheme established by the principal
Trade Sanctions and Human Rights 803
18 Gary C. Hufbauer et al., Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy (2nd edn,
Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990) 246–48 (concluding that sanctions
against South Africa were effective, citing three other scholars who hold the same view); Richard W.
Parker, ‘The Cost Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions’, 32 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 21 n 27 (2000).
19 See, e.g., Ryan Goodman, ‘Norms and National Security: The WTO as a Catalyst for Inquiry’, 2
Chi. J. Int’l L. 101, 104 (2001) (citing concerns expressed in Congress that Chinese accession to
WTO would make it more difficult for the US to sanction China for human rights violations).
20 See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, ‘Human Rights Sanctions and International Trade: A Theory of
Compatibility’, 5 JIEL 133 (2002), at 188–89 [hereinafter ‘Human Rights Sanctions and
International Trade’].
21 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Annex 2,
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Investment Disputes (the
Dispute Settlement Understanding), 15 Apr. 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
22 See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, ‘Compliance and Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation’, 32
Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 387, 438 (2000) (stating that the DSU ‘provides one of the most effective
sticks in international law’).
human rights treaties, by contrast, is widely regarded as weak.23 It relies on
committees that monitor implementation of the treaties, which have the
power to submit proposals, recommendations, and reports but no power to
adjudicate disputes or award relief.24
It appears that the fears of the human rights community are directly
traceable to the strengthening of the trade regime’s dispute settlement system.
Thus, the fact that South Africa was a founding member of the GATT25 did
not insulate it from apparently GATT-inconsistent trade sanctions.26 Human
rights organizations have expressed great concern that the new WTO would
effectively prevent the use of such sanctions today.27 In short, the human
rights community is concerned that, if trade law does in fact prohibit the use
of trade sanctions in response to human rights violations, then, given the
relative strength of the trade regime’s enforcement system, the prohibition of
trade sanctions is more likely to be complied with by reluctant states than the
prohibition of human rights violations.
Consider two parallel developments in China, one involving human rights
and the other involving trade. There have long been human rights problems in
China.28 These problems have for some years been the subject of scrutiny in
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23 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, ‘Human Rights and State ‘‘Sovereignty’’’, 25 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 31, 41
(1996) (observing that ‘[e]nforcement has always been seen as the weak link in the international legal
system, and it is surely the weak link of international human rights law’); Harold Hongju Koh, ‘How
Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?’, 74 Ind. L.J. 1397, 1398 (1999) (noting the common
view that human rights enforcement is weak).
24 See generally ICCPR, arts. 28–47.
25 See GATT 1947, preamble.
26 Although art. XXI(c) to GATT 1947 provides an exception for trade sanctions authorized by the
UN Security Council, and although the Security Council did authorize certain sanctions against the
apartheid regime in South Africa, South Africa was subjected to sanctions by GATT members such
as the United States that went beyond what was authorized by the Security Council. In 1977, the
Security Council called for an ‘embargo on shipments of arms, munitions, and military equipment’
to or from South Africa. U.N. S.C. RES. 418 (1977). In 1985, the Security Council called for
suspension of investment, guaranteed export loans, new nuclear contracts, and export of certain
computer equipment, while prohibiting trade in South African Krugerands. U.N. S.C. Res. 569
(1985). The 1986 US prohibitions against trading in agricultural products, minerals and steel with
South Africa were not authorized by the Security Council resolutions. The Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act (Anti-Apartheid Act or the Act), Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086 (1986). Eight
years after the imposition of US sanctions, apartheid ended when F.W. de Klerk ceded the reins of
the South Africa government to Nelson Mandela.
27 Eric Altbach, ‘USTR to Defend Massachusetts’ Burma Law’, JEI Report, 22 Aug. 1997, available at
1997 WL 9040487 (citing a 1997 letter to then US Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky in
which human rights organizations argued that if the WTO had existed in the 1980s, ‘state sanctions
against South Africa which helped bring peaceful democracy to that country would never have been
possible’).
28 See Amnesty International Report 2001 (reporting that in China during the calendar year 2000 ‘the
crackdown on religious groups and ethnic minorities continued unabated. Hundreds of followers of
‘‘heretical’’ religious or spiritual movements were arrested and reportedly tortured. At least 93 Falun
Gong followers were believed to have died in custody and hundreds of Buddhist nuns and monks
remained in detention in Tibet. Ethnic Uighurs labelled as ‘separatists’ or ‘terrorists’ were executed
the United States Congress, which, until recently, periodically considered
whether Most Favored Nation (MFN) status should be extended to that
country.29 For some time now, China has defended itself by criticizing
international human rights law as reflecting Western values. It has denied the
existence of universal human rights norms and decried the human rights
movement as an attempt to impose Western values on Asian states for which
they are inappropriate. Despite taking this position, however, China signed
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in October 1998 and
promised at that time to ratify it shortly.30 If China does ratify that treaty, it
will have bound itself to those norms, whether these rights are Western in
origin or not.31
The importance of such ratification for human rights in China, however,
could be significantly overshadowed by a parallel development: China’s entry
into the WTO system. The combination of China’s ratification of the ICCPR
and its entry into the WTO could be regarded as a net loss for human rights in
China. By ratifying the ICCPR, China would be opening itself up to the
scrutiny of the ICCPR Human Rights Committee. But this Committee lacks
the power to adjudicate or award relief. On the other hand, by becoming a
Member of the WTO, China may be insulating itself from the sort of scrutiny
that is backed by the possibility of economic sanctions. If so, the United
States and other WTO Members would no longer be free to consider the
denial of MFN status to China because of its human rights record. China
would automatically be entitled to such status as a member of the WTO.32
Moreover, as parties to the Dispute Settlement Understanding, the United
States and other WTO Members would themselves be subject to claims
before adjudicative tribunals if they fail to accord China MFN status, and the
judgments of such tribunals would be binding on them.
That the norms of the trade regime are backed by a more efficacious
enforcement regime has been a ground for suggesting that there is now an
additional hierarchy of norms in international law. Joost Pauwelyn has
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mostly after secret or summary trials where convictions were based on confessions extracted under
torture. Thousands remained in prison.’); see also Agence France Presse, 19 May 2001 (observing that
‘China’s controversial ‘‘one child [per couple]’’ policy continues to result in serious human rights
violations 20 years after it became law.’).
29 But cf. U.S.–China Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-286, 114 Stat. 880 (2000) (instituting
permanent normal trading relations with China, thereby ending Congress’s annual review of China’s
MFN status).
30 Though it has still not ratified the ICCPR, China continues to make such promises. See ‘China vows
to ratify UN rights covenants before United States’, Agence France-Presse, 14 Jun. 2000.
31 Pending ratification, China has an obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. See
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, art. 18.
32 See GATT 1994, art. I.
suggested that, in the international legal system, ‘in a sense, a ‘‘two-class
society’’ does exist, between rules of international law that can be judicially
enforced before a court with compulsory jurisdiction and those that cannot.’33
Other scholars similarly suggest that norms not backed by judicially
enforceable sanctions are less ‘binding’ than those that are.34 If the GATT/
WTO agreements did insulate states that violate international human rights
from economic sanctions and provide a legal remedy to states that violate
human rights against those that respond through economic sanctions, then
the claim that international human rights law has in some respects been
relegated to second-class status in the international legal system would have
some plausibility.35 But, if so, the second-class status of human rights norms
would not necessarily be the result of the existence of a more effective
enforcement scheme for trade norms than for human rights norms. The more
effective enforcement scheme could instead be a reflection of the international
community’s stronger commitment to compliance with trade norms than with
human rights norms. It would be that stronger commitment that would justify
the claim that trade norms have a higher status in international law. The more
effective enforcement scheme would simply be evidence of that stronger
commitment.
Indeed, on closer analysis, the mechanisms established in the WTO’s
Dispute Settlement Understanding are not significantly more coercive than
those of international law generally. The enforcement regime in international
trade law includes compulsory adjudication, including an appeal. These
features of the system permit the specification of Member state obligations in
particular factual contexts. Such specification certainly facilitates compliance,
as ambiguity in a norm’s applicability to particular facts makes violations
more likely. The existence of an appeal also lends reliability to the outcome of
adjudications, which also makes compliance more likely. But it is important to
note that the mechanisms for ‘enforcing’ the judgments of international trade
tribunals are basically the same as the mechanisms for enforcing international
806 Journal of International Economic Law (JIEL) 6(4)
33 Joost Pauwelyn, ‘The Role of Public International Law in the WTO’, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 535, 553
(2001). Pauwelyn does add in a footnote, however, that the absence of judicial enforcement
mechanisms does not mean that the norm will not be complied with, or even that its enforcement
regime is less effective. Id, at 553 n 119.
34 See, e.g., Joel Trachtman, ‘The International Economic Law Revolution’, 17 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L.
33, 58 (1996). Cf. James Thuo Gathii, ‘Re-Characterizing the Social in the Constitutionalization of
the WTO: A Preliminary Analysis’, 7 Wid. L. Symp. J. 137, 143 (2001) (noting critically that ‘it is
arguable that the peripheral place social issues occupy in trade analysis will result in the perpetuation
of a hierarchy that places the pro-trade agenda ahead of social issues’).
35 However, the claim can at best be that human rights norms (and others not backed by efficacious
compulsory adjudicatory mechanisms) are second-class norms along the dimension of the states’
commitment to compliance. In other respects, human rights norms – at least some human rights –
are thought to have a higher normative status than other norms of the international legal system. For
example, some human rights norms have the status of jus cogens. See below text accompanying n 92.
law generally. Specifically, international trade law depends on a regime of
countermeasures: if the losing state does not comply with the Appellate
Body’s judgment by altering its nonconforming conduct, the prevailing state
is entitled to take action that would otherwise infringe the losing state’s rights
under the WTO agreements. It can, for example, ban the importation of
certain products of the losing state, subject to rules of proportionality similar
to those that apply in international law generally. Indeed, with respect to
countermeasures, the DSU appears to be restrictive in its effects: it restricts
the circumstances in which countermeasures may be imposed (i.e., only after
a state has been adjudged a violator of its WTO obligations) and the types of
countermeasures that may be imposed (only benefits under WTO agreements
may be suspended).36
It is thus far from clear that international trade law is materially more
coercive than international law generally. The effectiveness of the regime for
enforcing international trade law may instead be attributable to the Member
States’ strong desire to maintain the trade system and their recognition that
the benefits of that system can be achieved only if all of the system’s rules are
generally complied with. Because of the interdependence of the system’s rules
and the reciprocal nature of the duties and benefits, self-interested states
rationally subordinate the short-term interests that might otherwise lead them
to violate their international trade obligations in order to attain the long-term
benefits afforded by that system. They fear that a violation of the rules will not
only lead other states to retaliate, but could also bring the entire system down.
And they are convinced that they have more to gain than to lose from the
existence of the system. This sort of rational self-interest is, in fact, what has
always led states to observe rules of international law in the absence of an
external force able to enforce the rules.
Indeed, it is not clear that the trade regime’s dispute settlement system has
produced increased compliance since the addition of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding in 1994. Compliance with the GATT and with GATT panel
decisions was actually quite strong in the pre-WTO era.37 And it is not clear
that compliance has improved significantly since the current dispute
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36 See DSU, art. 1 and GATT 1994, art. XXIII para 1 (provisions functioning jointly to limit
jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement body to disputes arising under GATT Agreements listed
in Appendix 1 to the DSU); DSU, art. 22 and GATT 1994, art. XXIII para 2 (provisions
functioning jointly to limit measures available if losing party does not comply with panel
recommendation to ‘compensation’ and ‘suspension of concessions’).
37 Robert E. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law: The Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System
(Salem, NH: Butterworth Legal Publishers, 1993) 285–87 (calculating that complaining party
received full or partial satisfaction of complaints in ninety percent of dispute settlement cases brought
under GATT 1947), cited in John H. Jackson, William J. Davey, and Alan O. Sykes, Jr, Legal
Problems of International Economic Relations: Cases, Materials and Text on the National and International
Regulation of Transnational Economic Relations (3rd edn, St. Paul, MN: West Pub Co, 1995) 339.
settlement system was put in place.38 The effectiveness of the trade regime
may thus not be attributable to the dispute settlement system. The elaborate
dispute settlement system may rather be evidence of a predisposition to
comply with trade norms.
Of course, if the GATT does preclude or restrict trade sanctions in response
to human rights violations, then the enforcement system for human rights
would lack at least one mechanism that the trade system enjoys: trade
sanctions. This would not necessarily deprive the human rights regime of all
sanctions of comparable coerciveness. In theory, at least, states would still be
able to respond to human rights violations by, for example, denying visas to all
persons from countries that violate human rights,39 or denying their airplanes
landing rights.40 Indeed, protection of human rights in certain contexts is
increasingly becoming recognized as a basis for the use of military force – with
808 Journal of International Economic Law (JIEL) 6(4)
38 See Carolyn B. Gleason and Pamela D. Walther, ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement Implementation
Procedures: A System in Need of Reform’, 31 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 709, 721–38 (2000) (citing five
cases of non-compliance with WTO DSB panel decisions between 1994 and 2000, including the
notorious failures to comply in the EU – Bananas and Beef Hormone cases). Of course, it is possible
that more marginal cases are being brought today because of the enhanced dispute settlement
system, and that the less marginal cases are being settled (or that less marginal violations of the
GATT are being successfully deterred by the stronger dispute settlement system). If so, then the
similarity in the rates of compliance with the decisions in adjudicated cases may not be an accurate
reflection of the effectiveness of the dispute settlement system. See Rufus H. Yerxa and Demetrios J.
Marantis, ‘Assessing the New WTO Dispute System: A U.S. Perspective’, 32 Int’l Law. 795, 808
(1998) (stating that ‘[t]he WTO Secretariat has recently pointed out that the new DSU is helping to
create a more effective deterrent to WTO violations’).
39 Compare Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton Act), Pub. L. No.
104–116 (1996) (Title IV mandating that US Department of State deny visas to aliens who have
confiscated or trafficked in property subject to claim under the Helms-Burton Act). It is true that
Helms-Burton was regarded by many as a violation of international law. See, e.g., Organization of
American States, Inter-American Juridical Committee, Opinion Examining the Helms-Burton Act,
27 Aug. 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1322 (1996). The attempt to defend the Helms-Burton law as a reprisal for
Cuba’s taking of property without compensation runs into the arguments that Cuba’s confiscation of
the property of persons who were not its nationals at the time of the taking did not amount to a
violation of international law, and that, in any event, the law had significant effects on the nationals of
third states. Cf. Schachter, above n 11, at 192 (otherwise valid countermeasure invalid if they ‘injure
innocent third parties’). A denial of visas to the nationals of a country that engages in gross violations
of human rights would not appear to suffer from this problem.
40 See ‘U.S. Actions estimated to cost Soviets $1.5–2 Million Annually’, Aviation Week & Space Tech.,
19 Oct. 1983, at 18 (stating that, in response to the imposition of martial law in Poland, the US
suspended its aviation treaty with the USSR exchanging landing rights); see also Theodor Meron,
Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (Oxford; New York: Oxford University
Press, 1989) 230–42 (arguing that sanctions for human rights violations may include withdrawal of
landing rights previously granted to the violating state by treaty). I am assuming here that the human
rights regime is not a ‘self-contained regime’. If it were, then the only enforcement measures available
for human rights violations would be those specifically set forth in human rights treaties, such as
complaints before the relevant treaty bodies. See generally Bruno Simma, ‘Self-Contained Regimes’,
16 Neth. Y.B. Int’l. L.111 (1985) (discussing and rejecting argument that the international law of
human rights is a self-contained regime). If the human rights system were a self-contained regime,
then trade sanctions would be unavailable quite apart from anything in the WTO Agreements.
the authorization of the Security Council41 and, much more controversially,
without.42 For this reason, among others, the broad claim that human rights
have been relegated to a second-class status in international law is too crude.
Nevertheless, the use of military force to protect human rights presents
problems of its own, and such force can in any event be resorted to only in
rare circumstances. The fact remains that, if the WTO agreements prohibit
the suspension of trade restraints in response to human rights violations by
Member States, it would deprive the human rights regime of one sort of
sanction that it previously possessed and that the human rights community
appears to regard as important. Whether they do deprive the human rights
regime of the option of employing economic sanctions is the subject of the
following section.
ii. present
In this section, I consider the extent to which current GATT provisions, as
they have been interpreted, prohibit or restrict Members from imposing trade
sanctions in response to violations of international human rights norms by
other Members. I first consider the permissibility of tailored sanctions – that
is, the prohibition of the importation of products produced in a way that
violates international human rights norms. I shall use as the paradigmatic
example of tailored sanctions a prohibition of the importation of products
made with indentured child labor. I then consider the permissibility of general
sanctions, such as a prohibition of the importation of diamonds from a
country that engages in torture.43 Because the GATT-legality of neither form
of human-rights-based trade sanction has been tested in GATT or WTO
adjudication, I shall discuss the WTO’s treatment of analogous sorts of trade
restrictions, taking into account possible differences between these analogous
restrictions and the two categories of human-rights-based trade restrictions
mentioned above.
The provisions of the GATT most directly relevant to human rights
concerns are Articles I, III, XI, and XX and XXI. Article XI prohibits any
quota or other ‘quantitative restrictions’ on imports or exports. Tariffs are
permitted, but Article II binds states not to exceed the maximum levels set
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41 See Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘Re-Leashing the Dogs of War’, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 446, 453 (2003)
(noting that, before Kosovo, states ‘took the position, time and again, that force could not be used for
humanitarian purposes without Security Council authorization’).
42 Id (noting that, after Kosovo, ‘the United Kingdom and Belgium spoke officially in terms of
developing a doctrine of humanitarian intervention’); Louis Henkin, ‘NATO’s Kosovo Intervention:
Kosovo and the Law of ‘‘Humanitarian Intervention’’’, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 824, 828 (1999) (‘The
NATO action in Kosovo, and the proceedings in the Security Council, may reflect a step toward a
change in the law . . . ’).
43 I borrow the terms ‘tailored’ and ‘general’ sanctions from Sarah Cleveland, ‘Human Rights
Sanctions and International Trade’, above n 20, at 138. For simplicity’s sake, I shall not discuss her
intermediate category of semi-tailored sanctions.
forth in lengthy schedules attached to the GATT. Article III is the ‘national
treatment’ provision. It provides that, once a product is imported, the
importing state may not be subject it to regulations less favorable than apply
to ‘like products’ produced domestically. Article I, the Most Favored Nation
clause, prohibits states from treating the products of one Member State less
favorably than the ‘like products’ of other Member States. Thus, Article III
prohibits discrimination between imported and domestic products, and
Article I prohibits discrimination between products of one country and those
of another.
Article XX sets forth a number of exceptions to the foregoing provisions. It
permits some otherwise prohibited measures, as long as ‘such measures are
not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade’.44 The most pertinent
of the exceptions in Article XX are found in subparagraph (a), which permits
measures ‘necessary to protect public morals’; subparagraph (b), which
permits measures ‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health’;
and subparagraph (e), which permits measures ‘relating to the products of
prison labour’. Another exception, relevant to trade restrictions in the
environmental context, is that found in subparagraph (g), which permits
measures ‘relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources . . . ’.
Finally, Article XXI, the so-called national security exception, provides in
relevant part that ‘[n]othing in [the GATT] shall be construed . . .
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests . . . (iii) taken in
time of war or other emergency in international relations; or
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its
obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of
international peace and security.’
Subsection (c) of Article XXI would validate any trade sanctions authorized
by the UN Security Council. Such sanctions have sometimes been imposed in
response to gross violations of human rights.45 Our examination will
accordingly be limited to trade sanctions imposed by one or a group of
states but not authorized by the Security Council. Subsection (b) of the
security exception will be discussed in due course. First, however, I shall
examine how the other cited articles of the GATT have been interpreted.
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44 GATT 1994, art. XX. This language is known as the article’s chapeau.
45 See, e.g., Sanctions against South Africa, above n 26; see also U.N. S.C. Res. 841, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/841 (1993) (imposing sanctions against Haiti for human rights violations).
A. Tailored sanctions
In the year 2000, a statute was enacted in the United States banning the
importation of goods made with ‘forced or indentured child labor’.46 It is
widely agreed that the use of forced or indentured child labor is a violation of
international human rights norms.47 Is the United States’ use of trade
measures to enforce these norms consistent with its WTO commitments? The
US law is a quantitative restriction that would appear to violate Article XI.
But here the Interpretive Note to Article III must be considered. This Note
indicates, in substance, that a regulation enforced at the border is valid if it
meets the national treatment standard of Article III.48 Under this Note,
therefore, the ban on importation of goods made with child labor can be
treated as a regulation banning the sale in the United States of goods made
with child labor. Is a regulation banning the sale in the United States of goods
made with child labor valid under Article III if it is applied to products made
in another Member State?
Not all commentators agree on the correct analysis, but the weight of
authority supports the conclusion that the law does not pass muster under
Article III. It might be argued that a law banning the sale of products made
with child labor is valid under Article III as applied to imported products
because the law applies equally to domestic products.49 Article III prohibits
Member States from applying to imported products any regulation that is less
favorable than the regulations that apply to ‘like products’ produced
domestically. A domestic product made without child labor is, according to
this argument, not ‘like’ an imported product made with child labor.50 An
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46 Trade and Development Act of 2000, Pub.L. 106–200, Title IV, § 411(a), 114 Stat. 298, amending
19 U.S.C. § 1307 (West Supp. 2000). This statute involves what is known as a PPM – that is, a trade
restriction based on the process by which a product was made. The initials stand for ‘Processes and
Production Methods.’ See Steve Charnovitz, ‘The Law of Environmental ‘‘PPMs’’ in the WTO:
Debunking the Myth of Illegality’, 27 Yale J. Int’l L. 59, 59 (2002) [hereinafter ‘The Myth of
Illegality’].
47 See ILO Convention No. 182 Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination
of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (Convention 182), 17 June 1999, 38 I.L.M. 1207, available at
http://www.ilo.org (accessed 9 June 2002); Univ. Dec. Hum. Rts. art. 4 (clarifying human rights
provisions in the UN Charter by declaring that ‘no one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery
and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.’); Conv. on Rts. of the Child, art. 32(1)
(prohibiting economic exploitation of children); Geneva Dec. of the Rts. of the Child (1924).
48 See Protocol Modifying Part II and Article XXVI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
signed at Geneva, 14 Sept. 1948, 62 U.N.T.S. 104 (publishing text of Interpretive Note to Article
III).
49 An argument along these lines is developed in Robert Howse and Donald Regan, ‘The Product/
Process Distinction – An Illusory Basis for Disciplining ‘‘Unilateralism’’ in Trade Policy’, 11 Eur. J.
Int’l L. 249 (2000), in the context of environmental PPMs. The authors reserve judgment on
whether their conclusions would apply outside the context of environmental PPMs. See id. at 283–
84.
50 See, e.g., Francesco Francioni, ‘Environment, Human Rights, and the Limits of Free Trade’, in
Francesco Francioni (ed), Environment, Human Rights and International Trade above n 20, at 17–18.
imported product made with child labor is ‘like’ a domestic product made
with child labor, and Article III is satisfied if in the United States the sale of
both is banned. This argument has not been widely accepted, however.51 The
term ‘like product’ has instead been understood to refer to the physical
characteristics of the product itself and certain aspects of how the product is
treated in the importing country, but not the way it was made in the exporting
country.52 This is the so-called product-process distinction.53 Thus, a
product made with child labor is ‘like’ a product made without child labor,
as long as the products themselves are the same.
Even if the prohibition of the importation of the products of child labor runs
afoul of Article III or XI, however, it might still be valid if it falls within one of
the exceptions in Article XX. The exception for the products of prison labor
would appear not to cover forced or indentured child labor, as the latter
category seems broader.54 Does the ban fall within the exceptions for
measures ‘necessary to protect public morals’ or ‘necessary to protect human
. . . life or health’? That would depend, first, on whether these provisions refer
only to measures by the importing state designed to protect the morals or
health of the people within its territory (what Steve Charnovitz has called
‘inwardly directed’ measures55) or also cover measures to protect the morals
or health of persons in the exporting state or elsewhere outside the importing
state (outwardly directed measures). It is clear that Articles XX(a) and (b)
encompass inwardly directed measures such as restrictions on the importation
of pornography or unsafe products; it is less clear that they encompass
outwardly directed measures.
Although the WTO has not spoken on the validity of human rights PPMs,
its treatment of environmental PPMs sheds some light on the issue. The
Tuna/Dolphin dispute involved a US restriction on the importation of tuna
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51 See Charnovitz, ‘The Myth of Illegality’, above n 46, at 92 (stating that, ‘[w]hatever the validity of
the [Howse and Regan] legal analysis, any optimism that future WTO panels will tolerate origin-
neutral PPMs in the context of Article III would be unfounded.’).
52 Id at 91 and n 170 (noting that the Appellate Body in the Asbestos case ‘makes clear that a
determination of ‘‘likeness’’ goes beyond the physical characteristics of the product’ and includes
‘such criteria as the end-uses of the product, consumers’ tastes and habits in respect to the product,
and the tariff classification of the product’).
53 For a critique of the product-process distinction, see Howse and Regan, above n 49. For a response,
see John H. Jackson, ‘Comments on Shrimp/Turtle and the Product/Process Distinction’, 11 Eur. J.
Int’l L. 303 (2000).
54 See Steve Charnovitz, ‘The Moral Exception in Trade Policy’, 38 Va. J. Int’l L. 689, 697 (1998)
[hereinafter ‘The Moral Exception’]. But cf. Sarah H. Cleveland, ‘Human Rights Sanctions and the
World Trade Organization’, in Francesco Francioni (ed), Environment, Human Rights and
International Trade (Oxford; Portland, OR: Hart Pub., 2001) 238–39 [hereinafter ‘Human Rights
Sanctions and the WTO’] (stating that ‘[t]he [prison labour] provision plausibly might be interpreted
to allow restrictions on goods made under prison-like conditions, such as certain forms of forced or
bonded labour, including certain forms of exploitative child labour’).
55 See Charnovitz, ‘The Moral Exception’, above n 54, at 695.
that had been caught in a manner that endangered dolphins.56 The United
States defended the ban as a measure ‘necessary to protect . . . animal . . .
health’. When Mexico challenged the ban, the panel agreed with Mexico’s
argument that the exception applied only to measures designed to protect the
health of dolphins within the United States. The panel expressed concern that
the United States’ interpretation would permit states to prescribe norms
extraterritorially and to penalize nationals of other states who fail to comply
with such prescriptions by denying them their trade rights under the GATT.
This pre-WTO panel decision was not adopted, and hence lacks the authority
the WTO Agreement accords to adopted GATT panel decisions, but it was
widely supported by GATT parties other than the United States.57
Commentators have questioned the Tuna/Dolphin panel’s view that the
measure involved in that case was extraterritorial. They have argued that a
ban on imports that were produced in a certain way is not a regulation of the
production process within the exporting state, but rather a regulation of
access to the importing state’s market. The measure is a purely ‘territorial’
one as it regulates the product’s entry into the importing state’s territory.58 In
my view, however, treating such a measure as extraterritorial is defensible.59
The very term ‘outwardly directed’ seems to be an acknowledgement that the
primary concern of the ban is with the welfare of persons outside the state’s
territory. Given that the whole point of the import ban is to induce a change in
the production process, it makes considerable sense to view the US law as an
attempt to regulate conduct taking place in another country, and the denial of
access to the US market as the enforcement mechanism.
The fact that, in the absence of the GATT, every state would have plenary
power under international law to control access to its market cannot suffice to
save the import ban from being regarded as extraterritorial under interna-
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56 United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, unadopted, 3 September 1991, DS21/R, BISD 39S/
155. Steve Charnovitz has usefully distinguished three categories of PPMs. See generally Charnovitz,
‘The Myth of Illegality’, above n 46. I shall limit my discussion here to the least problematic of these,
which he calls ‘how-produced’ PPMs. These consist of restrictions on imports based on the method
by which the product was produced. The other two categories are the ‘government policy’ standard
and the ‘producer characteristics’ standard, which respectively consist of restrictions based upon laws
or regulations of a foreign government regarding the production process, or its enforcement of them,
and restrictions based on the identity of the producer or importer. Some of the cases discussed in this
section actually involved these broader types of PPMs. I shall discuss them here as if they involved
how-produced PPMs and limit my discussion to objections made by the panels and/or Appellate
Body that would apply to how-produced PPMs.
57 See, e.g., id at 93. A second panel in the Tuna/Dolphin dispute took a somewhat different approach
to the jurisdictional question. United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, unadopted, 16 June 1994,
DS29/R.
58 See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, ‘Dolphins and Tuna: An Analysis of the Second GATT Panel Report’,
24 Env. L. Rptr. 10567 at n 76 (1994).
59 Lorand Bartels offers additional reasons for reaching the same conclusion in Bartels, above n 9, at
376–90.
tional law notions of prescriptive jurisdiction. The argument proves too
much. After all, because of the limits international law places on adjudicatory
and enforcement jurisdiction, no law of State A may be enforced by State A
against the nationals of State B unless the nationals of State B are present in
State A or have assets or are doing business there.60 If an environmental PPM
is not extraterritorial because it is merely a regulation of access to the
domestic market, then any other law of the state may be deemed applicable
worldwide on the theory that it, too, is in reality merely a regulation of access
to its domestic market.61 For example, State A might enact a law making it a
crime for anyone anywhere to spit on a sidewalk. Because such a law could
only be enforced against non-nationals if such persons or their property later
entered the territory of State A, the law could be characterized as a regulation
of the conditions for entry of persons or property into the territory of State A.
If the argument were accepted, however, no law would violate limits on
prescriptive jurisdiction; every law could simply be recharacterize as a
regulation of access to the regulating state’s territory. The very existence of
international law limits on prescriptive jurisdiction separate and apart from
international law limits on adjudicatory and enforcement jurisdiction shows
that concerns about extraterritoriality cannot be made to disappear through
such a sleight of hand.62
The fact that a measure is extraterritorial, however, does not mean that it is
invalid under international law. International law permits extraterritorial
regulation under certain circumstances, such as when the regulated conduct
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60 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 421 (1986) (listing grounds for jurisdiction to
adjudicate); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 431 (1986) (listing grounds for
jurisdiction to enforce).
61 This sort of argument was raised by defenders of the Helms–Burton law. See, e.g., Malcom Wilkey,
‘Helms-Burton: Its Fundamental Basis, Validity, and Practical Effect’, ABA Int’l Law News at 17
(Spring 1997) (arguing that Helms-Burton is not an example of extraterritoriality, ‘but the essence of
the principle of sovereignty’ to control access to national borders). The argument was not widely
accepted in that context, however. See, e.g., Organization of American States, Inter-American
Juridical Committee, Opinion Examining the Helms-Burton Act, 27 Aug. 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1322
(1996).
62 I do not consider here what the right test is to distinguish measures that are extraterritorial in the
relevant sense from those that are not. For example, I do not think that the denial of foreign aid to
countries that fail to meet certain unilaterally imposed standards would violate international-law
limits on legislative jurisdiction. On the other hand, a law making it a crime for non-nationals to do
certain things abroad that do not have an effect in the regulating state or threaten its security interests
would violate such limits, see note 63 below, even though such a law would only be enforced against
persons who set foot in the regulating state. What exactly distinguishes the first case from the second,
and whether, in the absence of the GATT, a denial of access to the US market to products made in
violation of unilaterally imposed standards would be closer to the first or the second, are extremely
complex questions. For an extended discussion and a proposed test, see Bartels, above n 9, at 376–
90. I merely note that the PPMs discussed in the text implicate concerns about extraterritoriality and
that it seems unlikely that a treaty the purpose of which was to limit the ability of states to impose
trade restrictions would bless trade restrictions raising extraterritoriality concerns of that nature.
has substantial effects in the regulating state.63 There is much to be said for
reading Article XX in the light of customary international law principles of
prescriptive jurisdiction. Given the intensity of the international controversy
about the United States’ attempts to legislate extraterritorially, it is hard to
believe that the members of the WTO would have subordinated the trade
rights being recognized in the treaty to a unilateral power of importing
countries to prescribe health and sanitary standards abroad for the protection
of persons beyond the jurisdiction of the regulating state. It seems much more
likely that the parties intended to grant importing states the power to insist on
production standards in the exporting state to the extent necessary to protect
its own nationals and others subject to its prescriptive jurisdiction under
international law. This approach would not prohibit outwardly directed trade
restrictions altogether, but it would require a showing that the importing state
possessed prescriptive jurisdiction under international law to impose the
standard that it is making a condition of access to its domestic market.64
The WTO Appellate Body’s most recent pronouncement on this issue is not
to the contrary. The Shrimp/Turtle case involved a US law banning the
importation of shrimp caught in a manner that endangered turtles. The
Appellate Body’s conclusion that such a ban prima facie fit within Article
XX(g) has been read as a rejection of the Tuna/Dolphin panel’s conclusion
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63 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 402(1)(c) (1986). See also id at § 402(2)
(permitting extraterritorial regulation on the basis of nationality); § 402(3) (permitting extraterritor-
ial regulation over conduct directed against a state’s security); § 404 (recognizing universal
jurisdiction over limited class of offenses).
64 Lorand Bartels similarly argues that Article XX should be interpreted in the light of international law
principles of legislative jurisdiction. See Bartels, above n 9. He goes on to argue that those principles
permit a state to prescribe rules where it has a ‘legitimate interest’, id at 374, and that all states have a
legitimate interest in promoting respect for human rights, id at 374. He concludes that Article XX
permits a state to impose PPMs for the purpose of promoting respect for human rights in other
states, id at 402. As Dr Bartels recognizes, id at 371 and n 82, this approach to legislative jurisdiction
is probably not the prevailing one. It seems to me that the existence of a particular norm of human
rights has little bearing, if any, on whether State A has jurisdiction to prescribe rules of conduct for
persons in State B. Given that human rights instruments contemplate that states will protect the
human rights of persons ‘within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction’, see International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2(1), to argue that the existence of a human rights norm
itself provides a basis for extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction seems like bootstrapping. Dr Bartels’
argument is also in tension with the fact that a small class of human rights – encompassing ‘certain
offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade,
attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism’ – is
recognized to give rise to the jurisdiction of states to prescribe when none of the more traditional
bases of jurisdiction to prescribe is met. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, § 404 (1987). I do not consider here the content of the international law principles on
legislative jurisdiction, but I am assuming them to be along the lines set forth in the Restatement
(Third), above, §§ 402–04. I consider below the different argument that Article XX permits states to
bar the importation of products made in violation of international human rights norms on the theory
that, in such circumstances, states are not prescribing rules of conduct for persons in other states, but
merely giving effect to independently binding rules.
that Article XX permitted only inwardly directed trade measures.65 However,
although the Shrimp/Turtle case does make it clear that not all outwardly
directed measures are outside the scope of Article XX(g), the Appellate Body
expressly left open ‘the question of whether there is an implied jurisdictional
limitation in Article XX(g), and, if so, the nature and extent of that
limitation’.66 According to the Appellate Body, the migratory nature of sea
turtles created ‘a sufficient nexus between the migratory and endangered
marine populations involved and the United States for purposes of Article
XX(g)’.67 That the tribunal did not require a showing that all of the individual
turtles protected by the ban traversed through US waters at some point in
their lives68 indicates that Article XX(g) tolerates some degree of outward
direction. Nevertheless, the Court’s holding is consistent with a requirement
of some jurisdictional nexus between the regulating state and the regulated
activity. Moreover, the reasons that may have led the tribunal to accept a
loose nexus in the context of Article XX(g) may not apply equally to Articles
XX(a) and (b) insofar as the latter two articles apply to people rather than
animals or plants.69 Ecological factors may well justify the conclusion that all
nations have an interest in the preservation of the Ozone Layer or of
endangered species. The claim that all nations have an interest in the morals
and/or health of all human beings, however, seems to challenge more directly
one of the central tenets of international society: the reciprocal bond of
allegiance between a state and its nationals.70
It might be argued that extraterritoriality shouldn’t be a problem for human
rights PPMs, at least to the extent that the predicate for the imposition of the
trade measure is the exporting state’s violation of a standard that is binding on
the exporting state as a matter of international law. Under such circum-
stances, the importing state is not unilaterally imposing a rule of conduct on
persons in other countries. By hypothesis, the relevant standard is imposed by
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65 See Jagdish Bhagwati, ‘WTO Afterword: The Question of Linkage’, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 126, 134
(2002) (implying that Shrimp/Turtle overturned Tuna/Dolphin).
66 Appellate Body Report Concerning United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, para 133, 12 Oct. 1998 [hereafter Shrimp-Turtle AB/R].
67 Id.
68 See Cleveland, ‘Human Rights Sanctions and the WTO’, above n 54, at 235 n 175 (quoting Shrimp-
Turtle AB/R at para 131: ‘it is not claimed that all populations of these [turtle] species migrate to, or
traverse . . . waters subject to United States jurisdiction.’).
69 See Shrimp-Turtle AB/R, para 26 (summarizing the argument made by the United States on appeal,
that the US law in question was substantially related to the preservation of the sea turtle species).
70 It is true that the emergence of an international law of human rights reflects the understanding that
all nations have an interest in the observance of the fundamental human rights of all persons, but
Articles XX(a) and (b) sweep more broadly than that, as they clearly permit measures to protect the
morals or health of persons even in circumstances not implicating international human rights. For
example, they would permit an Israeli ban on non-kosher meat products. See Bartels, above n 9, at
356. I consider below the more limited argument that Article XX should permit outwardly directed
measures designed to promote compliance in other countries with internationally recognized human
rights norms.
international law to which the exporting state is independently bound, in most
cases because it consented to the standard through treaty or over time through
the formation of customary international law. On this basis, commentators
have argued that Article XX(a) and/or (b) should be interpreted to permit
PPMs seeking to induce compliance with universally recognized human rights
norms.71
The solution has considerable appeal. That the predicate of the sanction is
the violation of an independently binding norm of international law
significantly alleviates the extraterritoriality concern.72 Moreover, reading
Articles XX(a) or (b) to incorporate the international law of human rights
finds some support in the Shrimp/Turtle decision, in which the Appellate
Body found it appropriate to interpret Article XX(g) in the light of evolving
principles of international environmental law.
On the other hand, a reading of Article XX(g) as incorporating evolving
norms of international environmental law is supported by that article’s
reference to exhaustible natural resources and by the WTO Preamble’s
reference to sustainable development. The text of Articles XX(a) and (b) do
not provide as clear a hook on which to rest a reading of those articles as
incorporating the international law of human rights. The provisions are not
written as an invitation to Member States to employ trade measures to induce
compliance by other states with international human rights norms.73 The
articles obviously authorize measures to protect against much more than
violations of internationally recognized human rights. The public morality
exception by its terms sweeps much more broadly than the international law
of human rights, as the concept of morality is broader than that of law (at least
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71 Charnovitz, ‘The Moral Exception’, above n 54, at 742; see also Cleveland, ‘Human Rights
Sanctions and International Trade’, above n 20, at 157–58; Janelle M. Diller and David A. Levy,
‘Child Labor, Trade and Investment: Toward the Harmonization of International Law’, 91 Am. J.
Int’l L. 663, 682–83 (1997) [hereinafter ‘Child Labor’]; Salman Bal, ‘International Free Trade
Agreements and Human Rights: Reinterpreting Article XX of the GATT’, 10 Minn. J. Global Trade
62, 108 (2001).
72 It does not necessarily eliminate the concern, however. In particular, such import restrictions may
interfere with the discretion of other states to the extent the relevant human rights instrument ‘leaves
it to the States parties concerned to choose their method of implementation in their territories’. See
UN Committee on Civil and Political Rights, General Comment 3 to Article 2 of the ICCPR (29
July 1981), available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/CCPR+General+commen-
t+3.En?OpenDocument>
73 Additionally, some scholars have argued that, to permit states to bar imports made in contravention
of human rights norms is improper because it would add a sanction to the human rights norms that
states did not agree to when they ratified the instruments recognizing the relevant norm. The claim is
that, when states adhered to such instruments, they did so with the understanding that the rights they
were recognizing would be enforced in the way specified in the instrument. This argument
apparently assumes either that the human rights instruments establish self-contained regimes, cf.
above n 40, or that general international law does not generally permit states to take countermeasures
in response to another state’s violation of the human rights of its own citizens, cf. above n 9. To the
extent either assumption is correct, the argument discussed in the text would indeed be subject to
this further criticism.
for the positivists among us).74 And the exception relating to human life and
health on its face sweeps more broadly than human rights, as it covers the lives
and health of animals and plants as well.75 The substantive breadth of these
provisions suggests that they were thought to be limited in their jurisdictional
scope – that is, that they were meant to apply only to inwardly directed
measures.76
The negotiating history offers little to rebut this inference. The negotiating
history of Article XX(b) ‘suggests a narrow focus on sanitary and
phytosanitary measures’.77 There is little direct evidence of what the framers
of Article XX(a) intended. Steve Charnovitz has argued that the lack of
discussion indicates that the parties ‘knew what it meant’,78 and in his view it
is reasonable to assume that they understood it to mean the same thing as
similar exceptions in prior treaties.79 He provides compelling evidence that an
exception in the 1927 Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export
Restrictions covering ‘prohibitions or restrictions imposed for moral or
humanitarian reasons’80 was understood to cover outwardly directed trade
measures. For example, he cites evidence that the exception was read by US
Senators to permit a ban on ‘the importation of goods made under forced or
compulsory labor’.81 It may be significant, however, that the term in the 1927
exception that appeared most directly to permit outwardly directed measures
(‘humanitarian’) was omitted from the 1947 GATT.82 Charnovitz also
uncovers evidence that numerous pre-GATT treaties imposed outwardly
directed trade restrictions. However, as he notes, almost all of the examples of
outwardly directed measures were also inwardly directed.83 Because the
GATT cannot be read to condemn an otherwise valid measure just because it
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74 See above n 70 (noting that this provision would permit an Israeli ban on the importation of non-
kosher meat products).
75 In other respects, however, Article XX(b) covers less than human rights, as the international law of
human rights addresses matters beyond human life and health.
76 With apologies to Steve Charnovitz, I use the term ‘inwardly directed’ in the remainder of this article
to include measures by a state designed to protect the morals and health of persons or things that are
its legitimate concern under international-law principles of prescriptive jurisdiction. ‘Outwardly
directed’ measures are those that seek to protect the morals or health of persons not subject to the
regulating state’s prescriptive jurisdiction under international law. As to the content of the relevant
limits, see above notes 63 and 64. It is worth recalling here that, under international law, states have
universal jurisdiction with respect to a small set of human rights norms, such as those regarding
genocide, war crimes, and the slave trade. See id.
77 Cleveland, ‘Human Rights Sanctions and the WTO’, above n 54, at 237.
78 Charnovitz, ‘The Moral Exception’, above n 54, at 705.
79 Id.
80 International Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions, art.
4, para 2, 8 Nov. 1927, 46 Stat. 2461, League of Nations Doc. C.I.A.P. 1927.
81 Charnovitz, ‘The Moral Exception’, above n 54, at 707.
82 Id at 717.
83 Charnovitz, ‘The Moral Exception’, above n 54, at 713–17.
is in part outwardly directed,84 the fact that pre-GATT treaties permitted
measures that were simultaneously outwardly and inwardly directed does not
appear to support the argument that purely outwardly directed measures fall
within the Article XX exceptions.
In sum, the negotiating history does not offer a strong basis for rejecting an
inference from the substantive breadth of these articles that the exceptions are
addressed to inwardly directed measures. The attempt to read these articles as
permitting states to impose outwardly directed measures if, but only if, a
violation of international human rights norms is the predicate for the trade
measure strikes me as an attempt to fit a square peg into a round hole.85 On
the other hand, the same might be said of much of the Appellate Body’s
reading of Article XX’s chapeau in Shrimp/Turtle. Its acceptance of this
reading of Articles XX(a) and (b) thus cannot by any means be ruled out.
If the extraterritoriality problem could be overcome, human-rights-based
PPMs would have to confront additional obstacles imposed by Articles XX(a)
and (b) and the chapeau of Article XX. I shall discuss here only the most
significant of these, the ‘necessity’ requirement of Articles XX(a) and (b).86
As noted, Articles XX(a) and (b) authorize only measures that are ‘necessary’
to protect public morals or human life or health. The Appellate Body has
interpreted this concept stringently, reading it to require that a trade measure
be the least trade-restrictive measure effective to promote the state’s valid
interest.87 As Sarah Cleveland notes, few if any human-rights-based measures
would satisfy this requirement, given the availability of other ways to seek to
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84 A ban on the slave trade (one of Charnovitz’s examples) would clearly fall within Article XX(a)
because it serves to protects the morals of persons in the importing state (see Charnovitz, ‘The Moral
Exception’, above n 54, at 714–15). The fact that it also protects the lives and health of prospective
slaves abroad does not make the measure invalid. Some scholars have claimed that a ban on the
importation of the products of child labor can be regarded as inwardly directed as well because it is
designed to avoid domestic support for or complicity in the underlying human rights violation. See,
e.g., Cleveland, ‘Human Rights Sanction and International Trade’, above n 20, at 138–39. In my
view, however, there are pertinent distinctions between the two. If owning a product made abroad
with child labour is immoral, it is immoral because it supports or encourages child labour abroad.
Owning slaves, on the other hand, is immoral because of its effects on persons within the country.
85 So read, the provision would permit a state to impose standards necessary to protect the morals or
health of their citizens or others subject to their legislative jurisdiction, even if those standards have
nothing to do with internationally recognized human rights, but would allow measures intended to
protect the morals or health of persons not subject to their legislative jurisdiction only if the predicate
for the PPM is a violation of an internationally recognized human right.
86 For a discussion of the others, see Cleveland, ‘Human Rights Sanctions and International Trade’,
above n 20, at 157–81.
87 Report of the Appellate Body in European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products (AB-2000-11) at para 170 (measure is ‘necessary’ under Article
XX(b) ‘only if there were no alternative measure consistent with the General Agreement, or less
inconsistent with which, . . . could reasonably be expected . . . to achieve [the relevant] policy
objectives’).
advance human rights.88 An inquiry into whether a human-rights-based trade
measure is ‘necessary’ to protect morals or health in the exporting state
implicates the debate about whether economic sanctions are at all effective in
achieving their asserted goals.89 It seems highly unlikely that the WTO
agreements were meant to establish a test that calls for a resolution of this
issue as well as the question whether alternative mechanisms would be more
effective. This may suggest that the Appellate Body has adopted too stringent
a definition of the ‘necessity’ standard and should adopt one more akin to
how the US Supreme Court has interpreted ‘necessary and proper’ in the US
Constitution.90 On the other hand, the term ‘necessary’ appears in these
articles unaccompanied by the softer term ‘proper’.91 The use of this term
may thus confirm that Articles XX(a) and (b) were never meant to authorize
the protection of the morals or health of persons beyond a state’s prescriptive
jurisdiction.
The foregoing analysis should suffice to show that a defense of human rights
PPMs as GATT-consistent would be an uphill battle, to say the least. If such
tailored sanctions are indeed GATT-inconsistent, an argument of another
sort might save a subset of them. In defending the US law banning imports of
the products of indentured child labor, some scholars have pointed out that
the use of forced or indentured child labor is not just a violation of
international law, but a violation of jus cogens.92 A jus cogens norm is a norm
that cannot be evaded even by treaty. In the event of a conflict between a
treaty norm and a jus cogens norm, the jus cogens norm prevails. For this
reason, it has been suggested, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body should
uphold the US law notwithstanding its nonconformity with the GATT.93
I am not so sure. Even if the international norm concerning child labor has
the status of a jus cogens norm, it does not necessarily follow that the GATT is
invalid insofar as it prohibits a ban on the importation of products made in
violation of that norm. The answer depends on the nature of the child labor
prohibition under international law. Normally, international legal norms
apply only to the conduct of states, not private parties.94 Thus, it might have
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18; Hufbauer, The Costs of U.S. Trade Barriers (Washington, DC: Institute for International
Economics, 1993); Richard Parker, ‘The Problem with Scorecards: How (and How Not) to Measure
the Cost-Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions’, 21 Mich. J. Int’l L. 235 (2000).
90 See McCulloch v Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 324 (1819) (interpreting ‘necessary’ in that
clause to mean ‘appropriate’). Cf. Cleveland, ‘Human Rights Sanctions and International Trade’,
above n 20, at 164.
91 Cf. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 324–25 (using the term ‘proper’ to clarify the meaning of ‘necessary’).
92 See Diller and Levy, ‘Child Labor’, above n 71, at 678.
93 See generally id.
94 See Joseph Brierly, The Law of Nations (6th edition, 1963) (offering the classic definition of
international law as ‘the body of rules and principles of action which are binding upon civilized states
in their relations with one another’).
been the case that international law only prohibits governments from making
use of child labor. On this view, there would be no violation of international
law when a private party uses child labor. But the international norm on child
labor is broader: it requires states to ban the use of child labor by private
parties.95 Thus, a state violates international law if it does not ban the use of
child labor, or if it does not effectively enforce the ban. The GATT would be
in conflict with such a norm only if it prohibited states from banning child
labor. But it does not; it prohibits states, at most, from banning the importation
of products made with child labor. The GATT would be in conflict with a jus
cogens norm only if the jus cogens norm required countries to ban the
importation of goods made with child labor. It is not clear that the jus cogens
norm relating to indentured child labor goes that far. It may simply require
countries to make it illegal for their citizens, or persons operating within their
territory, to use child labor.
There would perhaps be a conflict if the jus cogens norm prohibited any
conduct that encourages or supports child labor. It might then be argued that
allowing the importation of goods made with child labor conflicts with the jus
cogens norm because such importation has the effect of encouraging or
supporting the use of child labor in the exporting country. But this seems like
a slippery slope. Are countries required to prohibit all imports from the
exporting country (even of goods not made with child labor)? After all, a total
embargo is even more likely to induce the exporting country to prohibit child
labor than is a ban on the importation of one product. On this view, failure to
impose a complete embargo would be tantamount to ‘encouragement’ or
‘support’ of child labor. Why stop there? Perhaps the jus cogens norm requires
the importing country to invade the exporting country, annex its territory, and
directly enforce a ban on child labor. This suggestion is of course absurd, but
it serves to illustrate a broader point. Care must be taken in ascertaining the
addressee of the jus cogens norm and its scope. As a general matter,
international law has not imposed any particular duties on states concerning
how to react to violations of international law by other states.96 In theory, this
could change. Limited exceptions already exist. For example, nations are
required to abide by trade sanctions imposed by the Security Council,97 and
the ICJ indicated that states had a duty not to recognize certain acts of the
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95 ILO Convention No. 182 Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of
the Worst Forms of Child Labour (Convention 182), 17 June 1999, available at http://www.ilo.org
(accessed 9 June 2002). International law may only ban the use of certain forms of child labor. See id
(banning the use of the worst forms of child labor). References to child labor in the text should be
understood as references to the forms of child labor prohibited by international law.
96 Louis Henkin, ‘Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility’, 6 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 175, 181
(1967) (observing that states may acquiesce in or even applaud another state’s violation of
international law).
97 UN Charter, art. 25.
illegal South African regime in Namibia.98 A more general norm of
international law could conceivably develop requiring states to respond in
certain ways to other states’ violations of international human rights norms
having the status of jus cogens. Conceivably, this secondary norm could itself
achieve the status of a jus cogens norm. But it is far from clear that a jus cogens
norm has emerged yet requiring states to ban the importation of the products
of child labor.
B. General sanctions
The debate about the GATT-consistency of human-rights-based sanctions
has revolved to such a degree around the question of PPMs – i.e., tailored
sanctions – that some commentators appear to have forgotten that most
human rights sanctions have historically been general sanctions.99 Given that
‘[g]eneral . . . sanctions are the most common type of human rights trade
measure’,100 even if the debate were resolved in favor of the validity of human
rights PPMs, the GATT would represent a substantial contraction of the
remedies available to address human rights violations if it prohibited general
human rights sanctions. Most human rights violations do not culminate in a
product, let alone a product that is imported or exported. If the GATT/WTO
precluded all but tailored sanctions, it would greatly reduce the availability of
trade measures as mechanisms for giving efficacy to human rights norms.
The contestability of the case for human-rights-based PPMs bodes ill for
the case for general human rights sanctions. I shall consider here three sorts of
arguments that might be advanced to show the GATT-consistency of such
sanctions.
The first argument is that general sanctions fall within the Article XX
exceptions for public morals and/or human life or health. Although most of
the debate surrounding these exceptions revolves around the validity of
PPMs, the strongest arguments for accepting PPMs would also justify general
human rights sanctions. To overcome the extraterritoriality problem that
concerned the Tuna/Dolphin panel, defenders of human-rights-based PPMs
note that human rights norms are independently binding on exporting states.
If Articles XX(a) and (b) permit measures designed to protect public morals
or the health of persons in the exporting states by deterring the violation of
human rights in such countries, it is unclear why these articles would only
permit such protection through restrictions on the importation of products
themselves tainted by such human rights violations. The relevant question
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100 Cleveland, ‘Human Rights Sanctions and the WTO’, above n 54, at 142 (emphasis omitted).
under the texts of those provisions is whether the measure is necessary for the
protection of morality or health in the exporting country. As noted, the
question of necessity largely reduces itself to a question of effectiveness.
Banning the importation of products unrelated to the violation will often be
more effective at stopping the violation than banning the importation of a
related product. The case for interpreting Articles XX(a) and (b) as
permitting measures necessary to protect the internationally recognized
human rights of persons in the target state thus seems not to support a
distinction between tailored sanctions and general sanctions.
On the other hand, Article XX’s chapeau would appear to present
significant problems for the sort of general sanctions that have typically been
used by the United States. Even measures that otherwise would fall within
Article XX(a) or (b) would be valid only if they also satisfied the chapeau’s
requirement that the measures ‘not [be] applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail’. This requirement would present
severe problems for general sanctions as applied by the United States. Such
sanctions are usually country-specific. The United States would have a hard
time arguing that its sanctions apply equally to all countries where the same
conditions prevail. The divergent approaches to economic engagement
employed in the case of China as compared to the case of Cuba are only
the most obvious examples of what would probably be regarded as
discrimination under the chapeau’s standard. It is likely that the chapeau
would condemn any country-specific sanctions regime, requiring general
sanctions to be generally framed. The nondiscrimination standard it imposes
is, in any event, one that would not be satisfied by the current US sanctions
regime nor, given the politics of economic sanctions, by any sanctions regime
that could conceivably be enacted in the United States.
The second argument for sustaining general sanctions would rely on the
exception in Article XXI for ‘any action which [a contracting party] considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests . . . taken in time
of war or other emergency in international relations’. Under US domestic law,
the statutory authority for many of the general human rights sanctions
imposed by the United States is the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA), which authorizes the President to take a broad array of
actions.101 The recently imposed sanctions against Burma, for example, were
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investigate, regulate, or prohibit (i) any transactions in foreign exchange, (ii) transfers of credit or
payments between, by, through, or to any banking institution, to the extent that such transfers or
payments involve any interest of any foreign country or a national thereof, (iii) the importing or
exporting of currency or securities, by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States; (B) investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation,
regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding,
use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising
any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any
based in part on IEEPA.102 It was on the basis of the GATT’s security
exception that the United States defended the sanctions imposed upon Cuba
in the Helms-Burton legislation when they were challenged by the European
Union.103
The link between human rights and national security has become
considerably more evident after the attacks on the United States on 11
September 2001. Nevertheless, it seems difficult to regard the human rights
situation in such countries as Burma as involving the essential security
interests of the United States or an ‘emergency in international relations’. The
President’s success in imposing such sanctions pursuant to IEEPA probably
has more to do with the extreme deference the US judiciary affords the
President in matters of international relations, and the barriers to mounting a
judicial challenge to such an action, than to anyone’s belief that these
situations involve essential security interests or an emergency of any kind.
It is true that Article XXI(b) also contemplates judicial deference of a sort.
Some have argued that, because the exception covers any measures that the
relevant Member ‘considers necessary’ to protect its national security
interests, the exception is self-judging and thus unreviewable by a WTO
panel.104Others claim that some degree of review is appropriate and required.
Whether or not their measures can be judicially challenged, however, states
have an interest in maintaining the integrity of the GATT, including the
national security exception. The abuse of any provision threatens the whole
structure in much the same way as the failure to abide by the judgments of the
Dispute Settlement Body. That the matter will not be successfully attacked in
litigation is thus not a completely satisfying response to those who contend
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subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of any foreign person, foreign organization, or
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President may designate from time to time, and upon such terms and conditions as the President
may prescribe, such interest or property shall be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or
otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States, and such designated
agency or person may perform any and all acts incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of
these purposes.’).
102 Exec. Order No. 13,047, 62 Fed. Reg. 28301 (20 May 1997).
103 See Antonio F. Pe´rez, ‘WTO and U.N. Law: Institutional Comity in National Security’, 23 Yale J.
Int’l L. 301, 304 (1998) [hereinafter ‘WTO and U.N. Law’]. The challenge was eventually
withdrawn.
104 This was the United States position when Helms-Burton was challenged. See id. at 305.
that human rights related trade sanctions imposed on them are not in fact
justified under Article XXI(b).105
Sarah Cleveland has made a persuasive case for regarding the most severe
sorts of human rights abuses as ‘emergencies in international relations’
sufficient to trigger the essential security exception. She argues that, in the
light of ‘the extent to which human rights violations are now recognized as the
concern of all states’,106 ‘a twenty-first century definition of international
emergencies should include systematic violations of jus cogens norms,
wherever they occur.’107 The problem, however, is that Article XXI(b)
requires not just an international emergency but also a threat to the
sanctioning state’s essential security interests. As horrifying as the events in
Rwanda and Somalia were, they can be said to threaten the ‘essential security
interests’ of nations like the United States only if we so stipulate. This result
may well be ‘illogical’ and ‘absurd’,108 but that would appear to be an
argument for amending the security exception rather than for reading the
term ‘essential security interests’ out of it. It is also true that the international
community ‘increasingly has been willing to recognise jus cogens human rights
atrocities as matters which threaten international security and warrant
economic, humanitarian, and even military intervention . . . ’.109 But if the
international community in the form of the Security Council authorizes such
measures for such reasons (or others), the measures would be valid under
Article XXI(c). In any event, the arguments advanced by Prof. Cleveland
would bring within the scope of Article XXI(b) only a small subset of the
general human rights sanctions that have been imposed over the years.
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106 Cleveland, ‘Human Rights Sanctions and International Trade’, above n 20, at 185.
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108 Id at 185.
109 See Cleveland, ‘Human Rights Sanctions and the WTO’, above n 54, at 257.
If human rights sanctions were indeed to be imposed by states and defended
through an evidently strained interpretation of Article XXI(b), and adjudica-
tion of their validity were successfully avoided on the theory that the exception
is self-judging, it is possible that this development would not be viewed by
states as a threat to the integrity of the GATT. (It has been suggested to me
that the real reason the European Union dropped its challenge to Helms-
Burton was that no one, least of all the European Union, wanted the effective
scope of Article XXI(b) adjudicated.110) But, if so, the reason would most
likely be that the Members regard the WTO as an instrument for the
discipline of trade measures taken for protectionist purposes. Measures such as
the sanctions against Burma and Cuba have evidently been taken for non-
protectionist reasons, good or bad. This insight leads to the final, and perhaps
most controversial, argument for accepting the validity of human-rights-based
trade measures: such measures are GATT-consistent because the GATT was
never intended to – and thus does not – deny states the power they otherwise
possessed under international law to employ such sanctions as counter-
measures in response to violation of international human rights norms by
other states.
Although this argument has been advanced by few commentators,111 it
appears to capture the essence of the case some commentators have made for
a broad interpretation of Article XX. For example, arguing that the GATT
should be ‘[i]nterpret[ed] . . . to be consistent with international law’,112 Sarah
Cleveland has defended an interpretation of Articles XX(a) and (b) that
would permit general human rights sanctions. The argument proceeds in two
steps,
(a) Customary international law allows for the use of unilateral economic
measures to promote the human rights system. . . . States are recognised as
having an interest in prohibiting such conduct without any territorial nexus.
Moreover, the erga omnes status of human rights norms establishes that all
states have an interest in compelling compliance with human rights by other
states, regardless of whether the violating state’s conduct directly impacts other
states’ interests in the traditional sense.113
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110 Cf. John H. Jackson, ‘World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict’, 49
Wash. & Lee. L. Rev. 1227, 1254, n 68 (1992).
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environmental PPMs. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘Using Trade to Enforce International
Environmental Law: Implications for United States Law’, 1 Ind. J. Global Stud. 273 (1994). See
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112 Cleveland, ‘Human Rights Sanctions and International Trade’, above n 20, at 152. See also Diller
and Levy, ‘Child Labor’, above n 71, at 695 (observing that the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the GATT
regime in light of its object and purpose reveals that the treaty is not intended to override
fundamental human rights protections’).
113 See Cleveland, ‘Human Rights Sanctions and the WTO’, above n 54, at 236–37.
and
(b) Nothing in the GATT text purports to override these international law
principles.114
The first set of reasons for concluding that Articles XX(a) and (b) apply to
extraterritorial measures appears to be a statement and explanation of the
power of states to employ countermeasures under customary international
law despite the fact that human rights violations by definition do not injure
the state taking the measure in the traditional way. It is an elaboration of
general international law about human rights countermeasures.115 The
second step in the analysis explains why the power to impose such
countermeasures should be understood to remain available. The reason is
that the parties to the GATT did not intend to do away with the power.
The argument in this form seems to have little relation to Articles XX(a)
and (b). It is, rather, an argument that the GATT does not take away the
ability of states to employ economic sanctions in response to human rights
violations because there is no evidence in the text or negotiating history that
the parties meant to take this power away. This argument is more elegant than
the one relying on Articles XX(a) or (b), as it does not require an awkward
attempt to shoehorn the international law of human rights into articles about
the simultaneously broader and narrower concepts of morality, life, and
health. It faces considerable obstacles, however.
First, it is not the case that there is nothing in the GATT’s text that purports
to override the power to impose trade-related countermeasures. Article XI,
for example, is written broadly as a prohibition of all quantitative restrictions.
Read literally, this article would take away the power of states to employ such
restrictions in response to human rights violations unless the restriction falls
within an exception. Given these and other general provisions that on their
face apply to human-rights-based trade sanctions, the argument must take a
slightly different form. It would have to rely on the principle of interpretation
under which ‘a treaty ought to be so interpreted as to harmonize as far as
possible with existing rules of international law’.116 This principle is related to
but not the same as, the rule that one seeks through interpretation to avoid
conflicts among various rules of international law if at all possible. The latter
rule is not strictly speaking implicated in this situation because, as discussed
above, there is no conflict between an international-law rule recognizing a
power to employ trade sanctions in response to a human rights violation and
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a treaty that agrees not to exercise that power. The relevant rule of
interpretation is akin to the domestic law rule against implied repeals: in
the absence of clear evidence that the legislature intended to repeal a statutory
provision granting a power, a subsequent statute will be interpreted in such a
way as to preserve the power.117 Similarly, in the absence of clear evidence
that the parties intended the contrary, a subsequent treaty will be interpreted
in such a way as to preserve powers granted to states by previous treaties or
rules of customary international law.118
Under even the most robust approach to this rule of interpretation,
however, the argument would fail if the text or negotiating history of the
GATT/WTO revealed that the treaty was in fact understood by its framers to
be a comprehensive regulation of the parties’ ability to employ trade measures
in their relations. The argument for treating the GATT/WTO as non-
comprehensive would be based on the proposition that the parties to the
treaty were concerned with the use of trade measures for protectionist
reasons, not with the use of such measures for non-commercial reasons such
as concerns about human rights. Whether this is accurate, however, is
debatable.119 The Preambles to the GATT and the WTO agreements reveal
that the concerns of the Member States extended to such non-commercial
matters as ‘raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large
and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand . . . , while
allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the
objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the
environment . . . ’. Moreover, the inclusion of numerous exceptions in Articles
XX and XXI of the treaty tends to negate the existence of other exceptions,
under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The exception in XXI(c)
for measures authorized by the Security Council is particularly revealing of
the framers’ intent to regulate comprehensively the Members States’ power to
employ trade measures. Additionally, Article XXIII of the GATT, which sets
out a complaint procedure for states who believe their expected benefits under
the GATT were nullified or impaired by another Member’s action ‘whether
or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement’120 tends strongly to
support an interpretation of the GATT as comprehensive in its regulation of
the Members’ trade relations.
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At any rate, the significance of the rule of interpretation favoring a
construction that does not implicitly repeal a pre-existing rule of international
law is offset in this case by the so-called ‘rule of effectiveness’, which disfavors
a construction that would ‘deprive [a treaty] of the effect which the expressed
intention of the parties desired for it’.121 This rule appears to be relevant to
the argument under consideration in two ways. First, it is clear that the parties
intended at least to prohibit protectionist trade measures. Many measures
imposed purportedly for human rights reasons – for example, a ban on the
importation of the products of child labor – have protectionist effects and thus
possibly a protectionist purpose. A test that requires the disentangling of
altruistic from protectionist motivations or effects may thus be unworkable,
seriously reducing the effectiveness of the treaty at achieving its (by
hypothesis) limited purpose. States desiring a workable regime may well
have preferred a complete ban on such measures for prophylactic reasons.
Second, the argument based on the rule against implied repeals cannot
easily be limited to countermeasures taken in response to human rights
violations. The argument appears to be that the GATT should not be
construed to bar countermeasures otherwise permitted by international law
except to the extent there is specific evidence that the parties intended to bar
such countermeasures. Before the GATT, however, trade countermeasures
were permitted by customary international law (subject to rules about
necessity and proportionality) in response to the violation of any rule of
international law (except one that was part of a self-contained regime). If the
GATT were interpreted to prohibit only trade measures taken for protec-
tionist purposes, then trade measures would remain available in response to
the violation of a wide array of international legal norms. States would enjoy a
host of opportunities to circumvent GATT disciplines, and the effectiveness
of the regime would accordingly be significantly reduced.
In sum, the breadth of this third argument for upholding general sanctions
makes it unappealing to anyone seeking to preserve the effectiveness of
GATT disciplines. The first argument would be the most appealing from this
perspective, as it would permit externally directed trade measures only to the
extent necessary to enforce international human rights norms (and
presumably also international norms relating to the environment). However,
it appears that, in the light of the nondiscrimination requirement of the
chapeau, Articles XX(a) and (b) would effectively permit, at best, only a small
range of the general sanctions that are typically employed today. The second
argument, relying on the exception for essential security interests, is as a
substantive matter the narrowest basis for upholding general sanctions. On
the other hand, the self-judging nature of the exception renders it potentially
subject to great abuse. Ironically, however, the recognition that it is subject to
abuse may ensure that the exception is invoked only in truly exceptional cases.
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If the concern is to leave open a safety valve for the most egregious of human
rights violations, invoking the self-judging exception of Article XXI(b) for
such situations may be the best option, even if admittedly an extralegal
one.122 Interpreting Article XXI(b) in this way may be a defensible response
to the Security Council’s unreliability in exercising its monopoly under Article
XXI(c), much as the norms concerning the use of force have (arguably)
evolved to compensate for the Security Council’s unreliability in exercising
that analogous monopoly.123
iii. future
In this section, I examine a number of ways in which the WTO might in
theory approach the trade-human rights linkage. I shall begin with the options
that would give the WTO a strong role in directly protecting human rights,
and I shall work my way to approaches that would give the WTO little or no
role in this regard. Although my focus is on the normative appeal of the
various options, I shall not examine the options in a political vacuum.
Although I shall not offer a sophisticated political analysis, I shall take into
account whether the options would actually ever be seriously considered.124
My aim is not to reach definitive conclusions so much as to identify
potentially fruitful avenues for further research.
I consider four categories of options:
1. The first set of options would be to give the WTO the power to
enforce all international human rights norms through the mandatory
imposition of trade measures against states that violate such norms. A
weaker variant of this option would be to empower the WTO to
enforce certain specified categories of human rights by imposing
mandatory trade sanctions.
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interpretation such as the rule of effectiveness. But cf. McNair, above n 116, at 383 (criticizing the
rule of effectiveness). Of course, policies often clash, and it will often be impossible to ascertain what
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2. The second option would be to make compliance with international
human rights a condition of admission to the WTO club.
3. The third set of options would permit but not require states to impose
either general or tailored trade sanctions on states that have violated
human rights norms. There are a number of possible variations. The
sanctions might or might not be limited by a nondiscrimination norm
that would effectively preclude country-specific sanctions. More or
less stringent versions of necessity and proportionality requirements
might be imposed. A more limited version of this option would
permit states to impose trade sanctions for the violation of certain
specified categories of human rights violations.
4. The final option would deny states all power to depart from WTO
disciplines for the purpose of improving human rights conditions in
other countries. Under this option, states would be prohibited from
imposing either general or tailored sanctions; if they do impose such
sanctions, they would be violating their GATT obligations and thus
would themselves be subject to trade sanctions (countermeasures).
My discussion will assume that whatever regime is adopted would be
subject to the current WTO dispute settlement process, including WTO
panel adjudication and Appellate Body review. It would of course be possible
for the Members to adopt any of the foregoing approaches and insulate any
measures from review. Indeed, the WTO dispute settlement process is
currently undergoing review and may well change significantly.125 For
simplicity’s sake, however, I shall assume the continuation of the current
dispute settlement system in more or less its current form.
Option One. The first option appears to be an attempt to harness the dispute
settlement system of the WTO in the service of international human rights.126
It reflects what has been termed ‘penance envy’127 – that is, the human rights
community’s frustration and dissatisfaction with the fact that the trade system
is endowed with a vigorous and well-developed dispute settlement regime
while the enforcement system of the human rights regime is comparatively
flaccid.
The suggestion that human rights should penetrate the trade enforcement
regime in this way seems destined to misfire, however. As discussed in Part I,
the comparatively more effective dispute settlement process of the trade
Trade Sanctions and Human Rights 831
125 See Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration, para 30, 14 Nov. 2001, WTO Doc. No. WT/MIN(01)/
DEC/1, available at http://www.wto.org (accessed 19 May 2002) (calling for study of improvements
and clarifications in DSU procedures by 2003).
126 See, e.g., Patricia Stirling, ‘The Use of Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement Mechanism for Basic
Human Rights: A Proposal for Addition to the World Trade Ortganization’, 11 Am. U.J. Int’l L. &
Pol’y 1 (1996).
127 See Jose´ E. Alvarez, ‘Foreword’, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 1, 2 & n 4 (2002) (attributing term to Joel
Trachtman).
regime may not be the cause of the comparatively better record of compliance
with trade norms than with human rights norms. It may just reflect the
comparatively stronger commitment of the international community to strict
compliance with trade norms than with human rights norms. Indeed, the
WTO’s regime for maximizing compliance with the decisions of the DSB is
not significantly more coercive than the international legal system’s default
regime for enforcing compliance with legal norms generally. The WTO
ultimately relies on a system of trade countermeasures. The reason
compliance with DSB judgments is as good as it is may be that the Members
of the WTO value the benefits they receive from the system as a whole and
fear that non-compliance would threaten it. If the international community is
not similarly committed to strict compliance with human rights norms, then,
rather than increasing compliance with human rights norms, adding
international human rights to the WTO’s jurisdiction may well produce
more violations of DSB judgments and thus ultimately threaten the viability
of the trade dispute settlement system.
In any event, there is virtually no chance that this proposal would ever be
adopted. Under the strong version of this option, the WTO would attain the
power to halt trade of any given good or service with any given state if it finds
that the state has violated international human rights norms. Given the
breadth of international human rights law and the vagueness of much of it,
that would be a fearsome power. The fears that the United States has
expressed of abuse of the International Criminal Court, whether or not well
founded, would be miniscule by comparison.
The problem would become even more acute if the trade regime succeeded
in its aims. Underlying the case for trade liberalization is the idea that all
nations would be better off if states specialized in producing those products
and providing those services in which they have a comparative advantage. The
world foreseen by the international trade regime, therefore, is a world in
which all nations produce a limited range of products and depend on other
nations to provide them with other essential goods and to purchase the goods
they do produce. Trade liberalization, in other words, increases the
interdependence of states – one of the features of the phenomenon known
as globalization. The aim of such liberalization is, indeed, to speed this
process up. This has already been achieved to a significant extent. Thus, even
today, the power of an international institution to impose mandatory
multilateral trade sanctions would probably amount to the power to destroy
states. In a fully globalized world, such a power would be all the greater. Fears
of GATTzilla would be replaced by a terror of an even more fearsome
WTOgre. Visions of black helicopters would prevent the international
community from even considering the creation of such a monster.128
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A weaker version of this proposal would be to empower the WTO to impose
mandatory multilateral trade sanctions in response to the violation of certain
specified human rights norms. The more restricted the list of human rights
and the more egregious the violations included on the list, the more likely the
proposal is to be taken seriously. By specifically enumerating the human rights
involved, we would be eliminating the problem posed by the breadth and
vagueness of human rights norms. But the power to impose mandatory
embargoes would still be fearsome, especially in the globalized future foreseen
by the advocates of free trade. We already have a body empowered to impose
such embargoes – namely, the Security Council. True, the Security Council is
frequently incapacitated, but that is evidence that the international commu-
nity will not tolerate an effective delegation of this power to an international
organization of any sort. Given the absence of will to augment the power of
the Security Council or to disencumber it from its paralysis, it is difficult to
believe that the international community would be willing to give parallel
powers to the WTO. If it were deemed desirable that the power exist
somewhere, the Security Council would likely, and probably correctly, be
seen as its most suitable repository.
Option Two. The second option would be to make compliance with human
rights norms a condition of admission into the WTO.129 Perfect compliance
could of course not be required, as no state complies perfectly with its human
rights obligations, but perhaps a minimum standard could be required. The
European Union takes human rights into account in deciding whether to
admit new members,130 and this approach may be under consideration for the
Free Trade Area of the Americas.131 A glimpse at the most recent list of WTO
Member States shows that this approach is not followed by that organiza-
tion.132
Upon analysis, however, it appears that this proposal will tend to reduce
itself to some version of the third option discussed below. If adherence to a
minimal level of human rights protection were made a condition of admission
into the WTO club, it would also have to be made a condition of continuing
membership. If it were made a condition of continuing membership, there
would have to be some mechanism for enforcing the requirement. One
possibility would be to make expulsion or suspension the sanction for failure
to maintain the requisite standards. Expulsion and suspension, however, are
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severe penalties that are likely to be infrequently imposed. A more targeted
and thus more appealing remedy would be to permit Member States to
impose general or tailored sanctions on the state that fails to comply.
Options Three and Four. Various versions of the third option have already been
discussed. The current WTO agreements may already allow some versions of
this option. I shall consider whether this option is appealing from the
perspective of human rights protection, chiefly as compared to the fourth and
final option.
The third set of options differs from the first in that it would permit but not
require trade sanctions in response to human rights violations. The proposals
in this category leave the decision whether to employ a measure to each
individual country. This is an unappealing feature of these proposals. It
means that human rights norms would be much more easily enforceable by
economically powerful countries against economically weaker countries.
The proposals in this category are also problematic because, in different
ways, they result in haphazard enforcement of human rights law. If only
tailored sanctions were permitted, trade measures would be available to
enforce only those human rights norms that culminate in the production of an
imported good. Most human rights norms are wholly unrelated to the
production of goods. From a human rights perspective, there would appear to
be little reason to privilege the small subset of human rights norms that result
in the production of an imported good. As noted, trade sanctions are probably
no less effective as a whole at achieving improvement in human rights
problems unrelated to the good being imported. Nor do PPMs seem less
susceptible to abuse than general sanctions. Indeed, the regime of permissive
countermeasures on which the WTO relies for the enforcement of panel and
Appellate Body reports does not require any relation between the goods
whose importation is restricted and the underlying trade law violation found
by the DSB. It even permits cross-sectoral countermeasures, such as the
suspension of rights under TRIPS in response to a violation of a DSB
judgment regarding trade in goods.133
If general sanctions were permitted, trade sanctions would be available to
enforce human rights norms unrelated to the production of goods, but the
resulting enforcement regime would be haphazard in a different way. If a
provision were included like the one in the chapeau prohibiting discrimination
in the imposition of trade sanctions, then general sanctions would be
politically infeasible for the reasons set forth above, at least for all but the most
egregious of human rights atrocities. But if discrimination were permitted,
this method of enforcing human rights norms would be characterized by a
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troubling and potentially delegitimizing arbitrariness. This problem might be
thought to be particularly serious for a body of law (human rights) based on
the values of fairness, equality, and due process.
It is true that both of the problems identified above – the imbalance of
power to impose sanctions effectively and the element of arbitrariness and
haphazardness in the enforcement of human rights norms – are to a significant
extent characteristics of the existing international legal system. But to carry
these problems over into the trade regime would not simply perpetuate an
existing problem; it would make matters worse. As noted, the aim of trade
liberalization is to produce a world of specialized states, each dependent on
others for essential goods. Such states are of course far more vulnerable to
coercion through trade measures. The interdependence trade liberalization
seeks to bring about thus exacerbates the problems of power imbalance and
arbitrariness.134
One might well ask why we should be concerned about the power
imbalance and arbitrariness problems. If the effect of interdependence is to
make states more vulnerable to being influenced by economic measures taken
by other states, and if such measures were only permitted in response to
violations of human rights norms, this should all be to the good as far as
human rights enforcement is concerned. Why should it matter that the
powerful states will have more power than the weak to employ such measures
or that the measures will be applied haphazardly? Any successful human
rights sanction will by definition result in the improvement of some human
beings’ rights. If interdependence makes such measures more effective, all the
better. Improvement in the human rights situation of individual human
beings is to be applauded even if it is the result of a measure imposed by a
strong nation on a weak nation and even if the measure was imposed on some
nations but not others. The perfect should not be the enemy of the good.
There is great force to this argument, but let me venture a response. Human
rights law today covers a great deal of ground. It includes norms that
sometimes conflict with each other. Nations differ on which norms have
achieved the status of human rights, and on the importance of certain
categories of human rights as compared with others. To tolerate a system in
which powerful states may effectively impose on weaker states their views
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about what sorts of human rights should be protected and how this threatens
to delegitimize the whole body of international human rights law. ‘Interna-
tional human rights’ would soon become little more than a euphemism for the
norms that powerful states subscribe to. To be sure, this situation exists to a
nontrivial extent today, but increased interdependence would exacerbate the
problem.
The logic of trade liberalization may thus require not only the restriction of
the unilateral use of trade measures but also the multilateralization of human
rights enforcement. The decentralized pre-GATT regime relying on
unilaterally imposed countermeasures for the violation of human rights and
other norms of international law may be highly inappropriate in the
increasingly interdependent world envisioned by the trade regime. But, as
we have seen, centralizing control over human rights trade measures in a
WTO with the power to mandate trade sanctions is politically infeasible, to
say nothing of its desirability. The third option reflects a modest move in the
direction of centralization. Because (we are assuming) the individual states’
decision to impose sanctions in response to human rights violations would be
reviewable by WTO panels and the Appellate Body, the ultimate decision
about whether the trade measure would be allowed would depend on the
judgment of those bodies about whether a human rights violation occurred
and whether the other requirements included in the hypothetical provision
(which would presumably at a minimum include the requirements of
necessity and proportionality) have been met. But the decision to impose
the measure would be made by the regulating state in the first instance.
A preferable regime along similar lines might be to establish a new arm of
the WTO responsible for vetting in advance claims that trade sanctions are
warranted because of human rights violations. If it agrees, this new arm would
authorize the imposition of sanctions by Member States. This approach
would have the benefit of allocating to an international body the power to
weigh and possibly balance the human rights involved, as well as to assess the
facts and decide which sorts of trade measures are warranted. Having the
decision come before the imposition of the sanctions and having the decision
be made by a body having greater expertise in and sympathy with human
rights matters than existing organs of the WTO seems preferable to having the
decision come after the fact in the context of existing WTO dispute settlement
procedures.
This refinement of the third option alleviates but does not entirely solve the
problems of power imbalance and arbitrariness. The decision to authorize the
sanction would be centralized and entrusted to a presumably sensitive and
sympathetic arm of the WTO, but the decision to impose the sanctions or not
would continue to rest with the individual states. Is this approach preferable
to the fourth option, which is to disallow the use of trade measures in response
to human rights violations and keep the WTO out of the business of enforcing
human rights norms altogether?
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There are a number of potential problems with the third option from the
perspectives of both trade law and human rights law. Even the most refined
version of the third option would pose an important conflict with the goals of
trade liberalization. As noted, the aim of trade liberalization is to increase
wealth by inducing specialization among nations. If this goal were achieved,
trade sanctions could be expected to become an ever more effective tool of
human rights enforcement. But, for the very same reason, retaining the option
of employing trade sanctions to advance human rights makes it less likely that
this goal of the free trade system would ever be achieved. To the extent the
international community retained the option of employing trade sanctions,
states would continue to resist the free trade regime’s inducements to extreme
specialization. States would want to ensure that they continued to produce at
least some of all of the goods they regarded as essential, lest they be vulnerable
to such sanctions. If so, then it appears that the free trade system would be
able to achieve its goal of full specialization only if the international
community convincingly disavowed any possibility of trade sanctions being
employed.135
Indeed, since such a disavowal could in theory be reversed, achievement of
full specialization would require a super-strong and convincing commitment
by the international community in this regard. Since the Security Council
remains empowered to impose trade sanctions, it is probably only because of
the veto power that the most powerful countries would even begin to consider
the possibility of placing themselves at the mercy of states that sell them
essential goods or purchase the ones they produce. It might take some equally
effective disavowal of trade sanctions in the trade regime to bring about the
specialization contemplated by the trade system.
But the conflict is not just between the goals of trade liberalization and the
goals of the human rights regime. Trade sanctions are also in tension with the
human rights regime in a variety of ways. First, economic sanctions are
themselves problematic from the human rights perspective. To achieve an
improvement of the human rights situation in a country where human rights
problems are occurring, such sanctions often make matters worse for the most
defenseless in the target state. Indeed, the whole point of the sanctions is often
to make matters worse for such people in order to spark or intensify
opposition to the offending regime. Such sanctions thus treat human beings
as pawns in a geo-political game. They violate the Kantian injunction that
persons be treated as ends and not means, a principle that is arguably the
foundation of much of modern human rights law. Attempts to induce a
change in government, or in the behavior of an existing government, by using
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135 It is true that the trade system itself relies on trade sanctions as its mechanism for enforcing rights
under the trade agreements. But, in this context, trade sanctions are employed in the service of trade
liberalization. The possibility of such sanctions should not deter states from specializing; it should
reassure them that other states will adhere to their trade commitments.
military force against innocent civilians is clearly prohibited by international
humanitarian law. I do not claim that targeting innocent civilians with
economic sanctions is also forbidden by international law, only that doing so
is troubling from a human rights perspective. Scholars have defended ‘smart
sanctions’, which minimize the collateral damage of economic sanctions
much as smart bombs minimize the collateral damage of military opera-
tions.136 Whether smart sanctions can reduce collateral damage to an
acceptable degree remains to be seen. If not, then trade sanctions at best
would advance the protection of human rights in the long term only by
violating the human rights of persons in the target country in the short term.
Perhaps more importantly, imposing trade sanctions in response to human
rights violations may well set back the goal of respect for human rights even in
the long term. Advocates of trade liberalization maintain that there is in fact
no conflict between the goal of advancing free trade and that of advancing
respect for human rights. The trade regime does not seek trade liberalization
for it own sake. It seeks trade liberalization because, among other things, it
increases overall wealth. This goal of the trade regime is consistent with
human rights protection because human rights are more likely to be respected
in wealthy states than in poor ones. Rights are expensive.137 The link between
trade and economic and social rights is thus evident. A wealthy state is
obviously more likely than a poor one to comply with the right to a decent
standard of living.138 That greater wealth advances protection of civil and
political rights is more contested. Still, advocates of trade liberalization
maintain that these rights as well are more likely to be complied with in
wealthier states than in poor ones. They emphasize that wealth empowers
people and frees them to fight for their civil and political rights. Any true and
lasting advance in human rights protection, according to this view, requires an
increase in standards of living in poverty stricken states and, for this reason
trade liberalization is necessary for the advancement of human rights.
That free trade increases wealth is widely accepted among economists, but
some economists rightly worry that, unless provision is made to distribute the
fruits of the trade system equitably, only the already wealthy will benefit and
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136 See Matthew Craven, ‘Humanitarianism and the Quest for Smarter Sanctions’, 13 Eur. J. Int’l L.
43 (2002); see also Gary C. Hufbauer and Barbara Oegg, ‘Targeted Sanctions: A Policy
Alternative?’, 32 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 11 (2000).
137 See, e.g., Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes
(1st edn, New York: W.W. Norton, 1999).
138 See Univ. Dec. Hum. Rts. art. 25 (declaring that everyone ‘has the right to a standard of living
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing,
housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age, or other lack of livelihood in
circumstances beyond his control’).
social and economic rights will not be advanced.139Whether civil and political
rights will be advanced by free trade without direct enforcement efforts by the
international community is an even more complex and debated question.
This is not the place to engage in this debate. I only note its centrality to the
question of how the trade regime should approach human rights protection. If
indeed trade sanctions imposed for human rights violations thwart the trade
regime’s goal of increasing wealth through specialization in the world
economy, and if increased wealth is either necessary or desirable for the
advancement of human rights, then employing trade sanctions to advance
human rights may well be counterproductive. Trade sanctions may set back
the cause of human rights in both the short and long term. If so, then it would
appear that, from a human rights perspective, other strategies for advancing
human rights – ranging from military force as employed in Kosovo to the less
intrusive approaches employed by the UN Human Rights Committees –
should be preferred.
Even if it were true that increased respect for human rights follows
improvements in wealth and that trade liberalization increases wealth, it may
also be true that a trade regime cannot function effectively unless at least some
categories of human rights are effectively protected. Scholars have claimed
that respect for some categories of human rights is essential to a well-
functioning economy, which is in turn essential for a well-functioning
international trade regime. Free expression and the rule of law are often
placed in this category. If so, then it is arguable that the international trade
regime should seek to identify and make some provision for the advancement
of those categories of human rights, even if it otherwise eschewed any role in
the direct protection of human rights on the theory that the best way to
improve human rights is to increase wealth by promoting free trade.140 All
sides of this debate should be able to agree that the identification of such
rights, and the elaboration of strategies for protecting them, is an appropriate
function of the international trade regime.
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139 James Thuo Gathii argues that, because trade liberalization inevitably creates both winners and
losers, the trade regime must ‘account for and deal with both the negative and positive distributional
impacts that frequently result from the rules of international trade’. James Thuo Gathii, ‘Re-
Characterizing the Social in the Constitutionalization of the WTO: A Preliminary Analysis’, 7 Wid.
L. Symp. J. 137, 148 (2001). The trade regime currently leaves it to the Member States to
determine whether and how to alleviate the adverse impact of trade liberalization on certain sectors
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140 See Loukas A. Mistelis, ‘Regulatory Aspects: Globalization, Harmonization, Legal Transplants, and
Law Reform – Some Fundamental Observations’, 34 Int’l Law. 1055, 1069 (2000) (arguing that
human rights create the ‘necessary healthy environment for economic activity’).
